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INTRODUCTION
On November 20, 2014, President Obama signaled a significant turn in
U.S. immigration policy. Acknowledging Congress’s failure to adopt a
comprehensive overhaul of the nation’s “broken immigration system,” the
President announced measures to “help make our immigration system more
fair and more just.”1 The centerpiece of the announcement was a program
allowing certain illegal immigrants with children who are U.S. citizens or
lawful permanent residents “to apply to stay in this country temporarily
without fear of deportation.”2 Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson
issued a memorandum directing the head of U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services to develop a process for such immigrants to seek a
discretionary form of relief from deportation known as “deferred action.”3
Under the program, the parent of a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident
would be eligible for deferred action if the parent (1) has resided continuously
in the United States since before January 2010; (2) is not an enforcement
priority under simultaneously issued Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) guidance; and (3) presents “no other factors that, in the exercise of
discretion, makes the grant of deferred action inappropriate.”4 Johnson
ordered U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and U.S. Customs and
Border Protection officials to consider anyone they encounter for program
eligibility, including individuals in custody or with pending removal cases, so
as to “prevent the further expenditure of enforcement resources” on potential
beneficiaries of deferred action.5 A recipient of deferred action would be

1 Remarks on Immigration Reform, 2014 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 877 (Nov. 20, 2014),
[hereinafter President’s Address on Immigration].
2 Id.
3 Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Léon Rodríguez,
Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., et al. (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default
/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/RE6J-8URB] [hereinafter
Johnson Memorandum].
4 Id. at 4.
5 Id. at 5.
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considered “lawfully present in the United States”6 for a period of three years,
and would be “eligible to apply for work authorization” for that period.7
In announcing the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful
Permanent Residents program (DAPA), the President asserted that his
actions were “the same kinds of actions taken by Democratic and Republican
presidents before me.”8 Previously, however, the President had acknowledged
that broad relief from deportation would require congressional action.9 The
Administration thus anticipated significant controversy over the program’s
legality. The Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) had
prepared a thirty-three page opinion addressing the legal basis of DAPA,
including elements of an earlier proposal that it concluded were beyond the
President’s authority.10 The administration released that opinion when it
announced the program. Secretary Johnson’s implementing memorandum,
moreover, sought to place the policy within a safe harbor from judicial review.
Administrative enforcement discretion is an entrenched feature of our federal
system—a tool that Democratic and Republican Presidents alike have used to
accomplish policy objectives and one with which courts have been reluctant
to interfere. The Johnson memorandum thus characterized DAPA as
involving the exercise of “prosecutorial discretion through the use of deferred
action, on a case-by-case basis.”11
The battle over DAPA’s legality moved quickly to the courts. A federal district
court in Texas enjoined the implementation of the program,12 and the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.13 Both courts, however, skirted a key

6 Id. at 2.
7 Id. at 4.
8 President’s Address on Immigration, supra note 1.
9 See, e.g., Glenn Kessler, Obama’s Royal Flip-Flop on Using Executive Action on Illegal Immigration,
WASH. POST: FACT-CHECKER (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-

checker/wp/2014/11/18/obamas-flip-flop-on-using-executive-action-on-illegal-immigration/ [https://
perma.cc/9QPB-QE5D] (quoting President Obama as stating that expanded use of deferred action
would amount to “ignoring the law in a way that I think would be very difficult to defend legally
. . . . What I have said is that there is a path to get this done and that is through Congress.”).
Although the President was responding to a question about deferred action for parents of noncitizen
children who had themselves been granted deferred action, the President stated a general concern
about “broadening” deferred action, arising from his “job in the executive branch . . . to carry out
the laws that are passed.” Id.
10 The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens
Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op. O.L.C. (2014),
2014 OLC Lexis 2 [hereinafter OLC Opinion].
11 Johnson Memorandum, supra note 3, at 4 (emphases added).
12 Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677-78 (S.D. Tex. 2015) [hereinafter Texas I]. But see
Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (dismissing challenge to DAPA for lack of standing).
13 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015) [hereinafter Texas II].
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question about the Executive’s authority to adopt DAPA.14 DAPA’s critics had
argued not only that DHS’s proposed deferred action program violated procedural
requirements constraining agency action and substantive restrictions in the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),15 but also that the program violated the
Constitution’s admonishment that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.”16 The lower courts did not address that claim. In granting
certiorari in United States v. Texas to review the lower courts’ determinations that
DAPA is unlawful, however, the Supreme Court directed the parties to brief and
argue “[w]hether the [DHS guidance on deferred action] violates the Take Care
Clause of the Constitution, Article II, § 3.”17
With a one-sentence per curiam opinion in United States v. Texas, an equally
divided Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s decision.18 Although the
Court did not reach the question of DAPA’s constitutionality, DAPA provides
an interesting lens for exploring the President’s obligation of faithful execution.
The text of the Faithful Execution Clause19 frames two aspects of the debate
over the scope of administrative enforcement discretion. First, one can view
the clause as discretion-granting: in conferring or recognizing the President’s
power to “execute[]” the law, the clause seemingly embeds some flexibility to
decide when and how to exercise that power. Second, one can view the clause
as discretion-limiting: the clause calls for the President not merely to ensure
that the laws be executed, but that they be “faithfully” executed.
This Article uses DAPA to explore the tension between the discretiongranting and discretion-limiting features of the Faithful Execution Clause.
Guidance from the courts on the scope of administrative enforcement
discretion is sparse, and likely to remain so. The OLC opinion on DAPA’s
legality attempted to develop a framework for determining when an exercise
of enforcement authority breaches the Executive’s constitutional obligations
14 The district court concluded that DAPA was a substantive rule issued without the noticeand-comment procedures prescribed in the Administrative Procedure Act. Texas I, 86 F. Supp. 3d
at 671. The court of appeals agreed, and held as an alternative basis of affirmance that DAPA violated
the Immigration and Nationality Act. Texas II, 809 F.3d at 178, 186.
15 Texas II, 809 F.3d at 149 (reviewing assertions by a number of states challenging DAPA that
the law was both procedurally and substantively unlawful under the APA).
16 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; Texas II, 809 F.3d at 149 (“[T]he states urged that DAPA was an
abrogation of the President’s constitutional duty . . . .”).
17 United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906 (Jan. 19, 2016) (No. 15-674) (mem.).
18 United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (per curiam) As of this writing, the United
States’ petition for rehearing remains pending.
19 I rely in this Article on Peter Shane’s apt descriptive label, in lieu of the more conventional
“Take Care Clause” label. See Peter M. Shane, Returning Separation-of-Powers Analysis to Its Normative
Roots: The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions and Other Private Suits to Enforce Civil Fines, 30 ENVTL.
L. REP. 11081, 11102 (2000); see also Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power,
2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701, 706 n.10 (describing “Faithful Execution Clause” label as an
“unconventional” but “superior description of the clause”).
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of faithful execution. That framework embeds certain immigration-specific
elements, but its potential relevance transcends the immigration context. It
is worth asking, then, both what the Faithful Execution Clause means and
whether the OLC framework properly measures and constrains the scope of
administrative enforcement discretion.
The Faithful Execution Clause, I argue, has not and likely will not prove
decisive in disputes in court over the scope of administrative enforcement
discretion. That is not, however, because the Faithful Execution Clause does
not constrain executive conduct. The clause demands that the President
ensure that his subordinates act in good faith in enforcing the law. Whether
the clause itself imposes a duty of good faith on the President’s subordinates
is a complicated question. Even if it does not impose such a duty, the clause
necessarily requires that the President have the tools to do so.
This understanding of the Faithful Execution Clause calls into question
certain aspects of OLC’s framework for evaluating DAPA. First, OLC’s
framework for assessing administrative enforcement discretion collapses the
line between constitutional law and ordinary law, and neglects the latter. While
the framework does seek to test the substantive fit between DAPA and the
INA, that analysis is necessary not (or not only) as part of an inquiry into
whether DAPA is consistent with an obligation of faithful execution, but
because the law otherwise requires the alignment of DAPA with the INA.
Collapsing the constitutional and statutory layers of the analysis permits OLC
to countenance significant departures from Congress’s statutory scheme.
Second, although OLC’s framework in some respects properly seeks to
evaluate whether exercises of enforcement discretion are undertaken in good
faith, the framework effectively creates a presumption of good faith even with
respect to categorical exercises of enforcement discretion—i.e., those
exercises of enforcement discretion that are most likely to conflict with a
good-faith interpretation of the underlying statute. Third, even to the extent
that the framework demands executive officials’ good-faith interpretation of
the underlying statute, the challenges of interpreting the statute at issue
here—the INA—produce few constraints on executive action.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly describes the tool of
deferred action in immigration law, its implementation in an earlier executive
program, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), and the proposed
extension of deferred action that ultimately culminated in DAPA. Part I also
outlines the statutory and regulatory backdrop governing benefits and work
authorization for individuals who lack legal immigration status but whom
immigration officials forbear from removing. Part II explores the analytic
framework and key conclusions of the OLC opinion as to the latitude of the
executive branch’s enforcement discretion. Part III then examines the modest
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textual, structural, and historical clues to the meaning of the Faithful
Execution Clause. The Supreme Court has invoked the clause in a variety of
contexts, and this Part considers the scope and significance of these cases for
our understanding of the clause. Part III considers what constitutes faithful
execution and by what mechanisms the duty the clause imposes carries to the
President’s subordinates. Part IV revisits the OLC framework in light of the
understanding of the Faithful Execution Clause that Part III develops.
It is important to note that my analysis and conclusions address questions
of presidential power and administrative enforcement discretion, not the
merits of DAPA as a matter of policy. DAPA concerns a complex problem
with compelling humanitarian dimensions. This Article does not seek to tackle
that problem or to discount those dimensions. Rather, it seeks to address the
questions of executive authority that surround, and will no doubt survive, DAPA.
I. THE EXECUTIVE’S PATH TO DAPA
To understand the controversy surrounding the legality of DAPA, we
must understand some basic features of federal immigration law. Federal law
extensively regulates the status of immigrants in the United States, including
by delineating who is entitled to remain in the United States and who is
entitled to obtain work authorization or certain federal benefits. Below I
separately explore the regulatory frameworks that bear upon two key
elements of the DAPA guidance: DAPA’s direction to immigration officials
to forbear from removing unauthorized immigrants who meet certain criteria;
and the manner in which DAPA links a decision not to remove an alien with
eligibility for certain benefits and eligibility to seek work authorization.
A. Forbearance from Removal
Section 212(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, identifies
numerous grounds of “inadmissibility” to the United States, including
immigration law violations.20 In general, “[a]n alien present in the United States
without being admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United States at any
time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General, is inadmissible.”21
In other words, an alien who does not lawfully gain entry to the United States is
inadmissible. A separate section of the INA, section 237, provides that
inadmissible aliens—as well as lawfully admitted aliens who fail to maintain legal
status—are subject to being deported from the United States.22

20
21
22

Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2012) [hereinafter INA].
Id. § 212(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6).
Id. § 237(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1).
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These seemingly straightforward concepts of inadmissibility and
deportability do not tell the full story of the INA’s applicability to unlawful
immigrants. DHS estimates that the population of unauthorized immigrants
in the United States exceeds 11 million.23 By one estimate, removing the
entire population of unlawful immigrants would cost the federal government
$94 billion.24 DHS’s budget permits removal of fewer than 400,000
unauthorized immigrants each year.25 This gap between the INA’s putative
scope and its enforceable scope necessarily confers significant discretion on
DHS officials to determine how to allocate resources toward removal.26
When DHS issued the DAPA guidance, it also issued a separate
memorandum outlining its removal priorities.27 That separate memorandum
has gone unchallenged,28 and there is little question that DHS has the power
to establish enforcement priorities. If so, one must ask why DAPA’s
forbearance from removal is not simply a deprioritization of removal of a
category of unlawful aliens—those who are parents of U.S. citizens or lawful
permanent residents. The challenge to DAPA’s legality depends in part on
arguments about (1) how DAPA aligns with the statutory and extra-statutory
mechanisms for suspending or delaying removal of unauthorized immigrants;
and (2) whether DAPA collides with specific provisions of the INA that
provide more restrictive avenues for parents of citizens and lawful permanent
residents to achieve lawful status.

23
24

OLC Opinion, supra note 10, at 9.
See Nomination of Hon. Julie L. Myers to Be Assistant Secretary, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Hearing Before the Comm. on
Homeland Sec. & Gov’t Affairs, 110th Cong. 11 (2008) (statement of Julie L. Myers) (responding to
Senator Collins’s inquiry on the cost of deportations).
25 See OLC Opinion, supra note 10, at 9 (explaining that Congress appropriated resources to
Immigration and Customs Enforcement for removal of fewer than 400,000 aliens).
26 See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125
YALE L.J. 104, 131 (2015) [hereinafter Cox & Rodríguez II] (discussing “a profound mismatch between
the law on the books and reality on the ground” in the immigration context); Adam B. Cox & Cristina
M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 512-13 (2009) [hereinafter Cox &
Rodríguez I] (noting that, although provisions on deportability “lay out clear rules that do not confer
any de jure discretion on the Executive to determine who has lawful status and may therefore remain
in the United States, in practice they delegate tremendous authority to the executive branch”); Zachary
S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 745 (2014) (“[T]he breadth
and depth of substantive law . . . presumes a regime in which executive officials exercise discretion to
moderate the rigors of statutory prohibitions, thereby creating a law on the ground that more closely
approximates popular preferences than the law on the books.”).
27 Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas Winkowski,
Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, et al. (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov
/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf [https://perma.cc/9AE4-STKJ].
28 Texas II, 809 F.3d 134, 166 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he states have not challenged the priority
levels [Secretary Johnson] has established . . . .”).
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1. Discretion to Delay or Suspend Removal
The INA incorporates a variety of mechanisms permitting executive officials
to temporarily delay or suspend removal of unauthorized immigrants. Officials
can “parole” an alien into the United States, without formally admitting the
individual, “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit.”29
Likewise, the INA permits officials to grant “temporary protected status” to
avoid returning individuals to a country in armed conflict or based on other
extraordinary conditions.30 Officials have used other discretionary mechanisms
whose statutory pedigree is less clear, including deferred enforced departure31
and extended voluntary departure.32 The former involves deferred removal in
cases in which a noncitizen’s return to his or her home country would have foreign
policy implications.33 Through the latter—a form of discretionary relief that is
apparently no longer used—the Attorney General would declare a noncitizen
removable and secure his or her agreement to depart the United States
voluntarily, but would not impose a time limit for departure.34 For example,
through the Family Fairness program adopted in 198735 and expanded in 1990,36
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) granted voluntary departure
to certain spouses and children of aliens who had received legal status under the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.37
The particular form of discretionary relief at issue in DAPA is known as
“deferred action.” This form of relief dates back to at least the early 1970s and
was first used to delay departure in individual cases involving compelling
humanitarian considerations.38 More recently, immigration officials have used
29
30
31

INA § 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (2012).
Id. § 244(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1).
See, e.g., Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Sec’y of Homeland Sec. (Sept. 26,
2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/26/presidential-memorandum-deferred-enf
orced-departure-liberians [https://perma.cc/HWB4-PPFB] (invoking the President’s “constitutional
authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States” and extending deferred enforced departure
for Liberians not eligible for temporary protected status under the INA).
32 See Cox & Rodriguez II, supra note 26, at 122 (“The origins of, justifications for, and
evolution of [extended voluntary departure] are somewhat obscure and poorly understood.”).
33 See OLC Opinion, supra note 10, at 12 n.5 (explaining that deferred enforced departure may
be granted to nationals of foreign states affected by extraordinary conditions); Cox & Rodríguez II,
supra note 26, at 116 n.22 (“[P]residents since at least George H.W. Bush have halted the removal of
nationals to their countries of origins where doing so would have foreign policy implications.”).
34 See OLC Opinion, supra note 10, at 12 n.5.
35 Alan Nelson, Comm’r, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Legalization and Family
Fairness: An Analysis (Oct. 21, 1987), reprinted in 64 INTERPRETER RELEASES, app. I at 1201.
36 Gene McNary, Comm’r, INS, Memorandum, Family Fairness: Guidelines for Voluntary
Departure under 8 C.F.R. 242.5 for the Ineligible Spouses and Children of Legalized Aliens (Feb. 2,
1990), reprinted in 67 INTERPRETER RELEASES, app. I at 165.
37 Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 201, 100 Stat. 3359, 3394.
38 See, e.g., Leon Wildes, The Deferred Action Program of the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
Services: A Possible Remedy for Impossible Immigration Cases, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 819, 823 (2004)
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shared characteristics as a threshold to provide access to deferred action. For
example, the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)39 amended the INA to
permit certain aliens victimized by spousal or parental abuse at the hands of
a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident to petition for lawful status,
without having to rely on documentation from the abusive family member.40
Immigration officials have used deferred action to prevent removal of such
victims during the time period before a visa becomes available.41 Immigration
officials have similarly made deferred action available to immigrants with a
variety of other shared characteristics, including victims of human trafficking
and other forms of violence covered in certain visa programs;42 foreign
students whose lawful status expired as a consequence of Hurricane Katrina’s
interruption of their full-time studies;43 and widows or widowers of U.S.
citizens whose visa petitions had not been adjudicated at the time of the
spouse’s death.44 In June 2012, the President announced the adoption of the
DACA program, through which officials could defer removal of individuals
who entered the United States as children.45 Under the program, individuals
who arrived in the United States under the age of sixteen before January 2007,
and who were under thirty-one years of age at the time of the announcement,
could apply for deferred action and work authorization for a two-year
(discussing the origins of deferred action and describing deferred action as placement of an alien in
low-priority status for deportation for a “temporary period and reviewed biennially as a means to
prevent a recognizable or unconscionable hardship to either aliens or their families”).
39 Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40701, 108 Stat. 1796, 1953 (1994) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(iv) (2012)); see also Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-162, § 816, 119 Stat. 2960, 3060 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(vii) (2012)).
40 See 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)-(iv), (vii).
41 See, e.g., Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 3083 Before the Subcomm.
on Immigration & Claims of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 43 (2000) (statement of Barbara Strack,
Acting Executive Associate Comm’r for Policy and Planning, Immigration and Naturalization Service).
42 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T)-(U) (2012) (creating visa classifications for victims of human
trafficking and certain other crimes and their family members).
43 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Serv., Interim Relief for Certain Foreign Academic Students
Adversely Affected by Hurricane Katrina: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) 1 (Nov. 25, 2005),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/Special%20Situations/Previous%20Special%
20Situations%20By%20Topic/faq-interim-student-relief-hurricane-katrina.pdf [https://perma.cc/97CU-T5NB]
(referring to temporary suspension of certain requirements for qualified students affected by Hurricane Katrina).
44 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Serv., USCIS Provides Interim Deferred Action Relief
for Surviving Spouses: Relief for Spouses of Deceased U.S. Citizens Married Less Than Two Years
(Aug. 31, 2009), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Office%20of%20Communications
/Press%20Releases/FY%2009/August%202009/surviving_spouses_faq_0831.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9
R6-MYXW] (referring to temporary suspension for adjudication of widow(er)s’ visa petitions and
adjustment applications “where the sole reason for an adverse decision . . . would be the death of a U.S.
citizen spouse prior to the second anniversary of their marriage”).
45 See Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President on Immigration (June 15,
2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-immigration [https
://perma.cc/QH7V-NK8X] (“Effective immediately, the Department of Homeland Security is taking
steps to lift the shadow of deportation from these young people.”).
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period.46 Between 2012 and 2015, the program benefited more than a halfmillion unlawful immigrants.47 When Secretary Johnson announced the
details of DAPA, he also announced an expansion of DACA, removing the
age cap of thirty-one years, permitting applications from individuals who
entered before January 2010, and extending the deferred action period from
two years to three years.48
DAPA likewise seeks to benefit a group with a shared characteristic: those who
have a son or daughter who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. Some
five million individuals could benefit from DAPA should the program take effect.
2. Statutory Alternatives: Cancellation of Removal
and Immediate-Relative Visas
Whether or not DAPA fits comfortably with past exercises of deferred
action or other discretionary relief, including large-scale, category-based
forbearance from removal, there are additional questions about how DAPA
aligns with specific provisions of the INA. DAPA serves the humanitarian
goal of maintaining family unity for families with longstanding community
ties and children who are citizens or lawful permanent residents. In the INA,
however, Congress has provided narrower grounds for parents of U.S.
citizens and, in some cases, parents of lawful permanent residents, to achieve
permanent residence. For unauthorized aliens in the United States, the INA
provides for cancellation of removal if, among other things, removal would
result in “exceptional and unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or
child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence.”49 The INA permits cancellation of removal for no
more than 4000 aliens per year under this provision.50 The INA also
authorizes the issuance of “immediate-relative” visas, which permit the
parent of a citizen to enter and remain in the United States.51 The citizen,
however, must be at least twenty-one years of age.52 Moreover, the parent’s
46 Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar,
Acting Comm’r, Customs and Border Prot., et al., (June 15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets
/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [https://perma.cc/
VDU9-LBYD] (establishing eligibility criteria for the DACA program).
47 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., Number of I-821D, Consideration of Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals by Fiscal Year, Quarter, Intake, Biometrics and Cases Status: 2012-2015
(Mar. 31, 2015), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/Reports%20and%20Stud
ies/Immigration%20Forms%20Data/Naturalization%20Data/I821d_performancedata_fy2015_qtr2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HVK5-5XMM].
48 Johnson Memorandum, supra note 3, at 3-4.
49 INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2012).
50 Id. § 240A(e)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(e)(1).
51 Id. § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).
52 Id.
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prior unlawful presence in the United States generally will trigger at least a
three-year or ten-year bar on admissibility.53
As discussed below, DAPA authorizes immigration officials to tolerate a
DAPA beneficiary’s continued presence in the United States, and a DAPA
beneficiary’s presence is “lawful” presence for purposes of certain federal and
state benefits.54 DAPA, however, stops short of granting the lawful
immigration status available through the INA’s cancellation of removal and
immediate-relative visa provisions.55 The challenge is to determine whether
DAPA’s forbearance from removal—its recognition of legal presence without
a full grant of or definite path to lawful immigration status—can coexist with
these narrower but more permanent statutory avenues for entering and
remaining within the United States.56
B. Collateral Consequences of Deferred Action
In announcing that DHS officials would not remove individuals meeting
the criteria for DAPA, Secretary Johnson emphasized that DAPA “confers no
substantive right, immigration status or pathway to citizenship.”57 At the same
time, Secretary Johnson acknowledged two consequences that would flow
from deferred action. First, an individual receiving deferred action is
“permitted to be lawfully present in the United States.”58 Second, a deferred
action recipient is permitted to apply for work authorization.59
To understand the significance of these two features of the DAPA
program, we must again examine the INA.
1. Lawful Presence
Secretary Johnson’s memorandum makes clear that DAPA recipients do
not receive citizenship or a pathway to citizenship. Their presence in the
United States, however, is “lawful” in at least two senses. First, under the
INA, an unauthorized alien will accrue “unlawful presence” that could later
53 See id. § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I) (deeming an alien inadmissible for
three-year period, if the alien was unlawfully present for a period of more than 180 days but less than
one year); id. § 212(a)(9)(B)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II) (deeming an alien inadmissible for
ten-year period, if the alien was unlawfully present for a year or more); id. § 212(a)(9)(C)(i)(I), 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) (deeming an alien inadmissible for attempting to renter the United
States without being admitted, if the alien was ordered removed or was unlawfully present for an
aggregate period of a year or more).
54 See infra notes 60–64 and accompanying text.
55 Johnson Memorandum, supra note 3, at 5.
56 See infra notes 85–89 and accompanying text.
57 Johnson Memorandum, supra note 3, at 5.
58 Id. at 2.
59 Id. at 4-5.
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bar the individual from reentering the United States.60 Under DHS
guidelines, deferred action recipients cease accruing unlawful presence.61
Second, other federal statutes and regulations tie participation in certain
earned-benefit programs, including Social Security retirement and disability
and Medicare, to lawful presence.62 Deferred action recipients are lawfully
present for purposes of these programs.63 Lawful presence may also trigger
state-law entitlements.64
2. Work Authorization
Immigration officials have long coupled forbearance from removal, including
deferred action, with work authorization. To understand why the grant of work
authorization to DAPA beneficiaries is controversial, we must consider the INA’s
restrictions on the employment of unauthorized aliens. Until 1986, there existed
no general federal prohibition on the employment of unauthorized aliens.65 In
the Immigrant Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Congress made it
unlawful to hire an unauthorized alien, and defined that term in section
274A(h)(3) of the INA as an alien who is not, at the time of employment, “either
(A) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or (B) authorized to be
so employed by this Act or by the Attorney General.”66
With respect to the debate over DAPA, there are two possible interpretations
of the 1986 statute’s acknowledgment of a category of aliens for whom the
Attorney General could authorize employment. On one view, section 274A(h)(3),
60
61

See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
Memorandum from Johnny Williams, Exec. Assoc. Comm’r, Office of Field Operations, to Reg’l Dirs.
(June 12, 2002), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2015/unlawful_presence_
memo_06_12_2002.pdf [https://perma.cc/22F7-PHJA].
62 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(2)–(4) (2012) (exempting aliens “lawfully present in the United
States as determined by the Attorney General” from bar on receipt of Social Security benefits); 8
C.F.R. 1.3(a)(4)(vi) (2016) (defining “alien lawfully present in the United States” to include an alien
in deferred action status); 42 C.F.R. 417.422(h) (2015) (restricting Medicare eligibility to United
States citizens and those “lawfully present in the United States as determined in 8 C.F.R. 1.3”).
63 8 C.F.R. 1.3(a)(4)(vi) (2016).
64 That, indeed, was the crux of Texas’s claim in its suit to enjoin DAPA: that treating a DAPA
beneficiary’s presence as “lawful” triggered Texas’s obligation to issue subsidized driver’s licenses
and triggered an entitlement to unemployment compensation and unemployment insurance. Texas
II, 809 F.3d 134, 149 (5th Cir. 2015).
65 Prior to 1986, federal statutes did prohibit farm labor contractors from knowingly employing
unauthorized aliens. See Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-518, § 11(a)(3), 88 Stat. 1652, 1655 (prohibiting the knowing employment of any “alien not lawfully
admitted for permanent residence or who has not been authorized by the Attorney General to accept
employment”); Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-470,
§ 106(a), 96 Stat. 2583, 2589-90 (1983) (“No farm labor contractor shall recruit, hire, employ, or use,
with knowledge, the services of any individual who is an alien not lawfully admitted for permanent
residence or who has not been authorized by the Attorney General to accept employment.”).
66 Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 101(a), 100 Stat. 3359, 3368 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3) (2012)).
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by exempting an alien “authorized to be so employed by . . . the Attorney
General” from the employment prohibition, recognized or codified broad
executive discretion to grant work authorization to aliens, including unauthorized
aliens whom immigration officials forbear from removing. On another view,
section 247A(h)(3)’s reference to the Attorney General’s authority simply
acknowledges other statutory provisions that define circumstances under which
the Attorney General can grant work authorization—circumstances that do not
include all instances in which DHS grants deferred action.
DAPA’s recognition that deferred action beneficiaries can seek work
authorization depends on the former interpretation;67 the challenge to DAPA’s
legality rests on the latter interpretation.68
II. UNDERSTANDING THE OLC FRAMEWORK
Against this complex statutory and regulatory backdrop, OLC attempted
to develop a framework for determining whether the executive branch had the
power to adopt DAPA. In asking OLC to consider the legality of deferred
action for parents of children present in the United States, DHS proposed not
only to extend deferred action to parents of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent
residents, but also to extend deferred action to parents of DACA beneficiaries.69
OLC framed the issue as a question about the scope of the Executive’s
enforcement discretion. OLC’s analysis relied both on general separation-ofpowers considerations and on immigration-specific considerations.
OLC opined that as a general matter, “when Congress vests enforcement
authority in an executive agency, that agency has the discretion to decide whether
a particular violation of the law warrants prosecution or other enforcement
action.”70 That discretion, OLC wrote, is rooted in the President’s duty to “take

67 See Johnson Memorandum, supra note 3, at 4-5 (referencing “my authority to grant [work]
authorization reflected in section 274A(h)(3) of the [INA]”); OLC Opinion, supra note 9, at 21
(citing INA § 274A(h)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(h)(3), as “independent and more specific statutory
authority rooted in the text of the INA,” which “has long been understood to recognize the authority
of the Secretary (and the Attorney General before him) to grant work authorization to particular
classes of aliens”); Brief for the Petitioners at 50-57, United States v. Texas, No. 15-674 (June 23,
2016) (describing practice of linking work authorization with discretionary decisions not to pursue
removal, and the effect of IRCA on that practice).
68 See, e.g., Brief of 186 Members of the U.S. House of Representatives and 39 Members of the
U.S. Senate As Amici Curiae In Support of Petitioners at 25-28, United States v. Texas, No. 15-674
(June 23, 2016) (arguing that INA § 274A and subsequent statutory enactments foreclose the
argument that DHS has unfettered discretion to grant work authorization).
69 DHS also asked OLC whether it could implement a policy prioritizing the removal of
certain categories of aliens over others. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. OLC applied
the same framework to the prioritization proposal as it did to the deferred action proposal. See
generally OLC Opinion, supra note 10, at 2-11. I discuss only the latter here.
70 OLC Opinion, supra note 10, at 4.
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Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”71 Under the Supreme Court’s decision
in Heckler v. Chaney,72 the leading case on administrative enforcement discretion,
faithful execution of the law does not require “act[ing] against each technical
violation of the statute [an agency] is charged with enforcing.”73
OLC thus emphasized the discretion-granting side of the Faithful
Execution Clause. It paired that emphasis with two immigration-specific
observations. First, Congress’s delegation of power to the executive branch
to enforce the immigration laws is extremely broad, including with respect to
removal of unauthorized aliens, in part to enable executive officials to respond
to humanitarian and foreign policy considerations.74 Second, according to
OLC, the history of immigration law illustrates that the scope of an agency’s
enforcement discretion in immigration generally is subject to political rather
than judicial control: Congress has acted to limit executive discretion when
the executive branch has extended immigration relief beyond the bounds
Congress anticipated.75
Despite emphasizing the discretion-granting aspect of the Faithful
Execution Clause and recognizing broad enforcement discretion in the
immigration context, OLC opined that “[l]imits on enforcement discretion are
both implicit in, and fundamental to, the Constitution’s allocation of
governmental powers between the two political branches.”76 The constitutional
duty of faithful execution, OLC wrote, points to “at least four general (and
closely related) principles governing the permissible scope of enforcement
discretion that . . . are particularly relevant here:”77
First, enforcement decisions should reflect factors which are peculiarly within [the
agency’s] expertise . . . .
Second, the Executive cannot, under the guise of exercising enforcement
discretion, attempt to effectively rewrite the laws to match its policy preferences.
Third, the Executive ordinarily cannot . . . adopt a general policy that is so
extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities . . . .
71
72
73
74

Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
470 U.S. 821 (1985).
Id. at 831.
See OLC Opinion, supra note 10, at 4 (noting that Chaney’s principles apply “with particular
force in the context of immigration” and discussing the breadth of delegation to Immigration and
Naturalization Service and the Department of Homeland Security); id. at 5 (discussing the range
of considerations implicated in removal decisions, including “‘immediate human concerns’” and
“‘ensur[ing] that enforcement policies are consistent with this Nation’s foreign policy’” (quoting
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012))).
75 See id. at 6 (explaining that “political branches have addressed the proper allocation of
enforcement authority through the political process”).
76 Id. at 5.
77 Id. at 6.
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Finally, . . . a general policy of non-enforcement that forecloses the exercise
of case-by-case discretion poses special risks that the agency has exceeded . . . its
enforcement discretion.78

Before applying this four-part framework to the proposed deferred action
programs, OLC explored the history of executive officials’ use of deferred
action—including the transition from the use of deferred action for individual
cases to the use of deferred action for groups with shared characteristics—and
Congress’s response. OLC concluded that “Congress has long been aware of the
practice of granting deferred action, including in its categorical variety, and of its
salient features; and it has never acted to disapprove or limit the practice.”79
OLC acknowledged that deferred action differs in important ways from
other forms of enforcement discretion: it represents a decision to tolerate future
unlawful conduct, not merely a decision not to prosecute past unlawful conduct;
it carries benefits beyond forbearance from enforcement, namely the ability to
apply for work authorization; and it represents not case-specific relief for an
individual identified for removal, but rather an invitation for individuals
meeting specified criteria to apply for relief.80 After concluding that the
differences between this potential exercise of deferred action and other
exercises of enforcement discretion “are less significant than they might initially
appear,”81 the opinion noted that Congress, aware of the features that
distinguish deferred action from other forms of immigration relief, “has
repeatedly enacted legislation appearing to endorse such programs.”82
OLC then returned to the four principles and applied them to both proposed
deferred action programs—first, to provide relief for the parents of U.S. citizens
and lawful permanent residents, and second, to provide relief for the parents of
DACA beneficiaries. As for whether the proposed program reflected concerns
within DHS’s expertise, OLC focused principally on the “humanitarian interest”
involved: the asserted interest in promoting family unity by enabling “parents of
U.S. citizens and [lawful permanent residents] who are not otherwise
enforcement priorities and who have demonstrated community and family ties
in the United States (as evidenced by the length of time they have remained in
the country) to remain united with their children in the United States.”83 The
task of determining how to address such humanitarian concerns, OLC reasoned,
falls peculiarly within DHS’s expertise.84
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

Id. at 6-7 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Id. at 18.
Id. at 20.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 26.
Id.

1768

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 164: 1753

Turning to the program’s fidelity to the statutory scheme—whether the
agency, in effect, had rewritten the laws to match its policy preferences—OLC
found the humanitarian justification to be consonant with the INA. The
program, OLC reasoned, “tracks a congressional concern” with uniting the
immediate families of citizens and lawful permanent residents.85 Once a citizen
turns twenty-one years of age, he or she has the ability to petition for a visa for
a parent.86 Although the INA does not contain a similar provision for lawful
permanent residents, a lawful permanent resident can become a citizen and
then petition for a visa for a parent. According to OLC, granting deferred
action to parents of citizens and lawful permanent residents maintains family
unity for a category of immigrants with a “prospective entitlement” to lawful
status.87 OLC acknowledged that the INA incorporates other forms of
discretionary relief from removal for immediate family members of citizens
and lawful permanent residents, and that the criteria for those forms of relief
are far more restrictive than DAPA.88 OLC opined that executive-based
discretionary relief through deferred action would not conflict with statutory
provisions authorizing discretionary relief from removal or with statutory
avenues for parents of citizens to obtain lawful immigration status, because
deferred action is a more limited form of relief that provides no lawful
immigration status or path to citizenship.89
Turning to the third principle, OLC rejected the notion that DAPA
amounts to an “abdication” of agency responsibility. If DHS’s resource
constraints are such that the agency cannot remove the vast majority of
removable aliens in the United States, OLC reasoned, the deferred removal
of a subset of these aliens “does not, by itself, demonstrate that the program
amounts to an abdication of DHS’s responsibilities.”90
Finally, OLC opined that in light of the case-by-case nature of DHS
officials’ inquiry into whether to grant deferred action, the proposed program
did not amount to a “legislative rule overriding the commands of a statute.”91
Although OLC deemed lawful the elements of DAPA concerning
parents of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents, it rejected the
extension of that program to the parents of DACA beneficiaries. The
85
86
87

Id. at 27.
INA § 201, 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012); see supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
See OLC Opinion, supra note 10, at 32 (contrasting parents of citizens and lawful permanent
residents with parents of DACA beneficiaries).
88 Id. at 26-27; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (authorizing cancellation of removal for
unlawful immigrants who are immediate relatives of a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident,
where exceptional hardship would otherwise result to the U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident).
89 OLC Opinion, supra note 10, at 27 (characterizing DAPA as conferring “temporary relief . . .
sharply limited in comparison to the benefits Congress has made available through statute”).
90 Id. at 28.
91 Id.
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parents of DACA beneficiaries, OLC reasoned, lack a prospective
entitlement to lawful status.92 That fact distinguishes any concern for
maintaining family unity from the concern motivating deferred action for
parents of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents: “[I]n the absence
of any family member with lawful status in the United States, it would not
explain why [the] concern [for family unity] should be satisfied by
permitting family members to remain in the United States.”93
In sum, OLC’s DAPA opinion developed a detailed framework for
evaluating executive exercises of enforcement discretion. Although the
framework embeds certain immigration-specific elements, OLC relied more
broadly on separation-of-powers considerations, including the President’s
obligation of faithful execution. In the next Part, I consider the President’s
obligation of faithful execution in more depth, before returning to an
evaluation of DAPA and the OLC framework in Part IV.
III. MODELS OF FAITHFUL EXECUTION
IN ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
At the heart of the debate over DAPA’s legality, and at the heart of other
recent controversies over executive pronouncements concerning the
enforcement of federal statutes, is the President’s obligation under Article II,
Section 3 to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”94 OLC, as
noted, distilled from the constitutional duty of faithful execution four
principles limiting the scope of administrative enforcement discretion.95 In
its grant of certiorari in United States v. Texas, the Supreme Court directed
the parties to brief whether DHS’s deferred action guidance violates that
duty.96 This Part focuses on the substance of the faithful execution duty.
Before proceeding, however, I briefly consider two institutional questions.
The first question is who is subject to a duty of faithful execution. The
clause refers only to the President. It does not, for example, direct all officers
of the United States to faithfully execute the laws; it directs the President to
ensure the laws’ faithful execution. Even if the Faithful Execution Clause
does not itself constrain other executive officials, it is difficult to see how the
President could ensure faithful execution of the laws without the ability to
demand faithful execution by his subordinates, such as (in the case of DAPA)
the Secretary of Homeland Security. For purposes of this discussion, then, I
focus not only on the direct importance of the Faithful Execution Clause for
92
93
94
95
96

Id. at 32.
Id. at 33.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906 (2016) (mem.).
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the President’s conduct, but also on the implications of the clause for the
conduct of the President’s subordinates.
The second institutional question is who decides what constitutes faithful
execution. As will become clear, although courts have invoked the requirement
that the President “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” in a number
of contexts, courts have done little to flesh out that concept. There are at least
two different ways to think about the limited role of courts. One is that in a
range of cases that might raise questions about faithful execution, those
questions coincide or overlap with questions about proper interpretation of an
agency’s organic statute or of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).97 A
finding that agency conduct is not inconsistent with an organic statute or the
APA might eliminate most claims that the agency has breached an obligation
of faithful execution. Conversely (and as in the lower courts in the DAPA case),
a conclusion that executive conduct is inconsistent with an organic statute or
the APA would obviate the need to consider a constitutional claim.98 In other
words, when a case is or can be resolved on statutory grounds, limited
discussion of the Faithful Execution Clause is unsurprising.
The second way to think about the limited role of the courts is that, if it
is the President’s duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, it is
the President who determines what constitutes faithful execution. On this
view, the Faithful Execution Clause is nonjusticiable.99
This question and other questions of justiciability are critical to the
resolution of individual cases challenging executive conduct on constitutional
grounds. Because the executive branch must evaluate the legality of its own
conduct, however, the substance of the Faithful Execution Clause is important
independent of the justiciability of a challenge under that clause to executive
conduct. I turn now to that substance. I examine the constitutional text,
structure, and history of the Faithful Execution Clause before turning back to
DAPA in Part IV.

97
98

5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (2012).
See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth’y, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (“The Court will not
‘anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.’” (quoting
Liverpool, N.Y. & P.S.S. Co. v. Emigration Com’rs, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885))).
99 Cf. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 237 (1993) (holding that the Senate has the final
authority to give content to the word “try” in the Impeachment Trial Clause); Brief for the
Petitioners at 73, United States v. Texas, No. 15-674 (June 23, 2016) (rejecting “judicial
superintendence over the exercise of the Executive power that the [Faithful Execution] Clause
commits to the President”).
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A. The Constitutional Background
Article II, Section 1, Clause 1 provides, “The executive Power shall be
vested” in the President.100 There exists a robust scholarly debate over
whether the “executive Power” so vested consists merely of all of the powers
subsequently recognized in Article II, or whether the “executive Power”
connotes a distinct set of powers that a Chief Executive typically enjoys.101
Although that debate is beyond the scope of this Article, one’s understanding
of the Vesting Clause may color one’s view of the role the Faithful Execution
Clause plays in our constitutional scheme.
On a broad view of the Vesting Clause, the “executive Power”
encompasses—indeed, has at its very core—the power to execute the law.102
If so, without introducing redundancy, we cannot read the Constitution’s
instruction to the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed”
simply to confer the power to execute the law. The provision must do more.
We can ascribe two other plausible meanings to the Faithful Execution
Clause. The clause may clarify that the President’s law execution power does
not demand that the President execute the law himself, but rather obligates
the President to “take Care” that others do so. If so, the clause implies
whatever powers are necessary for the President to carry out that duty—for
example, granting the President the power to direct and control government
officials’ execution of the law.103 Another plausible meaning of the Faithful
100 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
101 Compare, e.g., STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY
EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 3-4 (2008) (arguing that the

Vesting Clause of Article II “is a grant to the president of all the executive power,” and that the
President’s powers go “beyond those specifically enumerated in Article II” to include “the power to
remove and direct all lower-level executive officials”), and Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses
as Power Grants, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1377, 1391 (1994) (arguing that any governmental action not
involving legislation or adjudication “must be an executive action which the President can control”),
and Prakash, supra note 19, at 714 (“The Executive Power Clause grants authority beyond those
powers listed elsewhere in Article II.”), with, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive
Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 585 (2004) (advancing textual and
historical arguments to demonstrate the nature of the Vesting Clause as “specific and functional
rather than categorical and essentialist”), and A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency’s New
Vestments, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1346, 1364 (1994) (“The chief problem with reading the Vesting
Clause[] as [a] grant[] of ‘executive’ . . . power is that we have no clear idea what those words mean
in the context of the Constitution other than from the text of the articles that follow.”).
102 See Prakash, supra note 19, at 716 (“If the Executive Power Clause vests anything beyond
the authorities listed in Article II, it surely vests the power to execute the laws.”).
103 See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, PCAOB and the Persistence of the Removal Puzzle, 80 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1371, 1384 (2012) (arguing the Faithful Execution Clause grants the President the powers
necessary to fulfill this obligation to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed); John F. Manning,
Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 2036 (2011) (“Since wellsettled rules of implication suggest that the imposition of a duty implicitly connotes a grant of power
minimally sufficient to see that duty fulfilled, the Take Care Clause seems straightforwardly to call
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Execution Clause is that it tightens the law execution role that the Vesting
Clause already confers by emphasizing that such execution must be
“faithful[].” The Faithful Execution Clause thus constrains executive
discretion by reining in any authority that the “executive Power” might
otherwise be thought to confer to execute the law in a manner that is not
“faithful[]” (or to decline to execute the law altogether).104
On the narrower view of the Vesting Clause, the “executive Power” refers
to those powers recognized elsewhere in Article II.105 Under this view, if the
President has a power to execute the law or to direct others to do so, that
power must derive from the Faithful Execution Clause. If so, the clause is
self-limiting, in the sense that it constrains the President to ensure that
executive officials carry out the law “faithfully.”
Whether one views the Clause as tightening or conferring a law execution
role, one must still confront what “faithful[] execut[ion]” of the law entails.
In Founding-era dictionaries, definitions of the word “faithfully” support
varied constructions of the text. For example, faithful execution might imply
strict adherence to the law,106 or it might imply a sincere and honest effort
carry the law into effect.107 Other constitutional provisions do not shed
significant light on the clause. The concept of faithful execution appears in
only one other constitutional clause: the Presidential Oath Clause. That
clause requires the President to swear or affirm that he or she “will faithfully
execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of
[his or her] Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the
United States.”108 If the Presidential Oath Clause simply restates the concept
of faithful execution, it provides limited insight into the phrase’s meaning in
the Faithful Execution Clause. At most, one could argue that the addition of
for the recognition of sufficient ‘executive Power’ to allow the President to remove subordinates
who, in his or her view, are not faithfully implementing governing law.”).
104 See Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement
of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 799 (2013) (“The
Take Care Clause is . . . an instruction or command to the President to put the laws into effect, or at
least to see that they are put into effect, ‘without failure’ and ‘exactly.’”); Prakash, supra note 19, at 722
(“The Faithful Execution Clause imposes a duty of faithful law execution on the only officer who enjoys
the executive power.”).
105 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 47 (1994) (“As we conceive it, the framers intended the Vesting Clause to vest
constitutionally little more than the enumerated executive powers.”).
106 See 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1755) (defining
“faithfully” as “[w]ith strict adherence to duty and allegiance” and “[w]ithout failure of performance;
honestly; exactly”); see also Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 104, at 799 (arguing that it is unnatural to
read the Take Care Clause as allowing deviation from “strict enforcement” of the law).
107 See 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1755), supra note
106 (defining “faithfully” as “[s]incerely; with strong promises” and “[h]onestly; without fraud, trick,
or ambiguity”).
108 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.

2016]

Faithful Execution and Enforcement Discretion

1773

the phrase “to the best of my Ability” in connection with the President’s duty
to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution, but not in connection with
the President’s duty of faithful execution, suggests that the duty of faithful
execution is the stronger of the two, and requires more than that the President
act to the best of his or her ability.109 Alternatively, one could view the concept
of faithful execution as synonymous with “to the best of [the President’s]
ability,” such that the phrasing of the Presidential Oath Clause indicates that
the two duties are commensurate.110
While the phrase “faithful[] execut[ion]” might support more than one
interpretation, the Constitution supplies other contextual clues. The
Constitution calibrates the congressional and presidential roles in lawmaking.
Article I grants Congress the legislative power, while the President’s role in the
process is to “recommend” consideration of “such Measures as he shall judge
necessary and expedient,”111 and to sign or veto measures approved by a
majority of both houses of Congress.112 Although these structural mechanisms
do not tell us what constitutes “faithful[] execut[ion],” they do sketch some
outer limits. For example, an executive decision to disregard a law—absent a
concern that the law is itself unconstitutional—collides with these core
structural principles, for it would grant the President a second veto that the
Constitution does not contemplate.113 More generally, an executive decision
that displaces or undermines a law could exceed the President’s powers, either
because it constitutes “lawmak[ing]”114 or because the President cannot
overcome Congress’s contrary will without an independent source of power.115
The historical background of the Faithful Execution Clause likewise
suggests an outer limit to presidential discretion. Here, two aspects of the
Constitution’s drafting history warrant discussion. Early proposals would
109 Cf. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XIX (requiring that the governor “take care that the laws are faithfully
executed to the best of his ability”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 464 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob
E. Cooke ed., 1961) (noting similarity of the President’s powers to those of the New York governor).
110 Cf. Prakash, supra note 19, at 723 (suggesting that the deletion of the “best of his ability”
language from the Faithful Execution Clause eliminated redundancy).
111 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
112 Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
113 See Price, supra note 26, at 690 (“Allowing the President to disregard duly enacted laws with
which he disagrees would . . . giv[e] the President a form of second veto over laws . . . that he does
not wish to see enforced during his presidency.”).
114 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (“In the framework
of our Constitution, the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the
idea that he is to be a lawmaker.”).
115 See id. at 602 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[N]othing can be plainer than that Congress
made a conscious choice of policy in a field full of perplexity and peculiarly within legislative
responsibility for choice.”); id. at 639 (Jackson, J., concurring) (rejecting claim of presidential
authority where “Congress has not left seizure of private property an open field but has covered it
by three statutory policies inconsistent with this seizure”).
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have provided that the President had authority to execute the laws.116 James
Madison’s notes indicate that the delegates approved a proposal vesting the
president with the power “to carry into execution the nation[al] laws.”117 The
Committee of Detail considered different formulations,118 ultimately
reporting out a provision stating that the President “shall take care that the
laws of the United States be duly and faithfully executed.”119 The Committee
of Style deleted the phrase “duly and.”120
Some have argued that the shift from recognizing the President’s
authority to execute the laws to imposing a duty to ensure that the laws are
executed was intended to emphasize the primacy of Congress in lawmaking.121
Others suggest that the clause “merely modified the president’s executive
power,” so as to “ensure faithful execution.”122 On either view, the President
cannot decline to execute a law, at least absent a good faith belief that the law
is unconstitutional. Declining to execute a law would either undercut the
primacy of Congress in lawmaking or disregard the manner in which the
Faithful Execution Clause narrows the executive power.
The second aspect of the drafting history that warrants discussion is the
possibility that the Founders sought to codify the rejection of the claims of
English monarchs to the powers to suspend (temporarily or permanently) the
operation of certain statutes and to dispense with the application of statutes
to particular individuals. Following the Glorious Revolution, the English Bill
of Rights of 1689 repudiated these powers.123 Numerous states incorporated
116 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 20-23 (Max Farrand ed., 1966)
(presenting Madison’s notes outlining the Virginia plan) [hereinafter CONVENTION RECORDS I].
117 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 32 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
[hereinafter CONVENTION RECORDS II]; see also id. at 132 (reflecting referral to the Committee of
Detail); CONVENTION RECORDS I, supra note 116, at 63, 67, 230, 236 (reflecting proposed changes
to the Virginia plan).
118 CONVENTION RECORDS II, supra note 117, at 171. Versions include formulations attributed
to James Wilson (“He shall take Care to the best of his Ability, that the Laws of the United States
be faithfully executed.”) and John Rutledge (“It shall be his duty to provide for the due & faithful
exec—of the Laws of the United States to the best of his ability.”). For the attributions to Wilson
and Rutledge, see id. at 163 n.17. The “take care” formulation was common to certain state
constitutions, including those of New York, Pennsylvania (of which James Wilson was a delegate),
and Vermont. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XIX (requiring the governor “to take care that the
laws are faithfully executed to the best of his ability”); PA. CONST. of 1776, art. II, sec. 20 (providing
that members of the executive council “are also to take care that the laws be faithfully executed”);
VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. II, § XI (same).
119 CONVENTION RECORDS II, supra note 117, at 185.
120 Id. at 600.
121 See, e.g., Price, supra note 26, at 693 (“The evolution of the Take Care Clause from a powergranting to a duty-imposing provision underscores that the Framers intended Congress to have
policymaking supremacy.”).
122 Prakash, supra note 19, at 724.
123 See An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and Settling the Succession
of the Crown (Bill of Rights), 1689, 1 W. & M., c. 2 (Eng.) (condemning James II for “assuming and
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prohibitions on suspension into their constitutions.124 The delegates to the
Philadelphia Convention, in debating whether the Executive should have a
power to veto legislation, considered both whether any presidential veto
power should be absolute125 and whether the President should have the power
to suspend legislation for a defined period.126 The delegates unanimously
rejected both proposals.127 Although no evidence directly links the Faithful
Execution Clause to the repudiation of the suspension power,128 many
scholars argue that the clause serves that purpose.129 Whatever the concept of
faithful execution might encompass, the drafting history suggests that it does
not encompass the power to suspend or disregard duly enacted laws. Courts
reaffirmed that understanding early in our nation’s history.130

exercising a power of dispensing with and suspending of laws and the execution of laws without
consent of Parliament”); id. (providing “[t]hat the pretended power of suspending of laws or the
execution of laws by regal authority without consent of Parliament is illegal” and “[t]hat the
pretended power of dispensing with laws or the execution of laws by regal authority, as it hath been
assumed and exercised of late is illegal”).
124 See Steven G. Calabresi et al., State Bills of Rights in 1787 and 1791: What Individual Rights
Are Really Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1451, 1534 (2012)
(noting that six state constitutions confined suspension and dispensation to the legislatures only);
see, e.g., DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 7 (“That no Power of suspending Laws, or the
Execution of Laws, ought to be exercised unless by the Legislature.”); MD. CONST. of 1776,
Declaration of Rights, art. VII (“That no power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws, unless
by or derived from the Legislature, ought to be exercised or allowed.”); VT. CONST. of 1786, ch. 1,
art. XVII (“The power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws, ought never to be exercised,
but by the Legislature, or by authority derived from it, to be exercised in such particular cases only
as the Legislature shall expressly provide for.”); VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of Rights, § 7 (“That all
power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws, by any authority, without consent of the
representatives of the people, is injurious to their rights, and ought not to be exercised.”).
125 See CONVENTION RECORDS I, supra note 116, at 98-103 (noting the various discussions of
an executive veto at the Constitutional Convention).
126 See id. at 103-04 (discussing the possibility of term periods for executive suspension of legislation).
127 See id. at 103-104 (recording that an absolute veto and a suspension period were voted down by all delegates).
128 Prakash, supra note 19, at 726 n.113.
129 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, PRESIDENTIAL DEFIANCE OF “UNCONSTITUTIONAL”
LAWS 16 (1998) (describing the clause as a “succinct and all-inclusive command through which the
Founders sought to prevent the executive from resorting to any of the panoply of devices employed
by English kings to evade the will of Parliament”); Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 104, at 803-04
(joining scholars ascribing such a purpose to the clause, and observing that “it is scarcely conceivable
that a federal Executive modeled on the Governor of New York should have been vested with a
power that had long since been denied to the English King”).
130 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1230 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342) (“The
president of the United States cannot control the statute, nor dispense with its execution, and still
less can he authorize a person to do what the law forbids.”). The author of this opinion, Justice
William Paterson, had served as a delegate to the Philadelphia Convention and was the primary
proponent of the New Jersey Plan. See 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
557, 611 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (listing Paterson as a delegate and reproducing the New Jersey Plan
also called the Paterson Resolutions).
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In sum, the text, structure, and history of the Constitution demonstrate that
a President who countenances disregard for or suspension of the law does not
“take Care” that the law is “faithfully executed.” The more difficult question is
what actions, short of explicit suspension, breach the duty of faithful execution.
B. The Evolution of Enforcement Discretion
Some scholars argue that the Constitution’s Faithful Execution Clause
imposes a duty of “strict” enforcement on the Executive—that the President
must enforce the laws “without failure” or “exactly.”131 As discussed above, it
is questionable whether the constitutional text and drafting history bear the
weight of that position.132 More broadly, one must ask whether such a narrow
understanding of faithful execution does violence to the concept of
“execution”—the discretion-granting side of Article II.
Whether one links the Executive’s power to carry the law into execution
to the Vesting Clause or to the Faithful Execution Clause, that power embeds
some discretion to decide how to carry the law into execution. Our
constitutional system separates legislative and executive powers in part to
guard against tyranny.133 If the Constitution required enforcement without
discretion, then the separation of the executive and legislative powers would
have little liberty-protective value. On the criminal side, for example, the
Constitution presumes that before the government exercises criminal power
over an individual, “Congress must criminalize the conduct, the executive
must decide to prosecute, and the judiciary . . . must agree to convict.”134 The
Constitution appears to presume not only that executive officials apply
general laws to specific factual scenarios, but also that they can moderate the
effects of the law in particular circumstances. Executive officials have done so
from the time of the Founding in cases in which they believed that individuals
subject to criminal prosecution were innocent.135 More generally, there is
strong evidence from the nation’s early history indicating that Presidents and
executive officials exercised discretion not only in cases of innocence, but also

131
132
133

Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 104, at 799.
See supra notes 107-120 and accompanying text.
See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1516
(1991) (describing efforts to preserve the separation of powers “as a concern for protecting individual
rights against encroachment by a tyrannical majority”).
134 Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1017
(2006) (footnotes omitted).
135 See, e.g., Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 554 (2005)
(discussing President Washington’s direction to enter a nolle prosequi on certain indictments).
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where officials considered particular offenders “undeserving of punishment
for reasons of justice or equity.”136
The modern practice of executive discretion, of course, goes well beyond
these foundational concepts of declining enforcement in specific cases for a
narrow set of reasons. That practice reflects a complex mix of factors that have
been well catalogued elsewhere,137 including the dramatic expansion of the reach
of federal law with little expectation on Congress’s part that the executive branch
can or should enforce those laws to their fullest extent.138 Modern Supreme
Court cases reflect and entrench broad conceptions of the scope of prosecutorial
discretion139 and, as discussed below, the Court has carried those conceptions to
the context of administrative nonenforcement.140 The next Section explores the
range of cases in which the Court has applied the Faithful Execution Clause for
clues about the scope of the obligation that clause imposes.
C. Judicial Understandings of Faithful Execution
The Supreme Court has invoked the Faithful Execution Clause in a range
of contexts, including in cases addressing prosecutorial or administrative
enforcement discretion, standing, and removal, among others.141 In exploring
the Court’s treatment of the clause, I focus here on cases addressing executive
discretion and cases addressing the removal power. The former category bears
most directly on the topic at hand. The latter category is mainly of interest
because, unlike in other contexts, the Faithful Execution Clause appears to
be critical to certain holdings. The clause’s primacy in the removal power
136 Price, supra note 26, at 730; see also Prakash, supra note 135, at 552-63 (describing presidential
control over prosecutions in the early Republic, including instances in which Presidents directed
termination of prosecutions).
137 See Price, supra note 26, at 754-63 (describing factors influencing federal nonenforcement
policies in the areas of marijuana possession, immigration, and environmental standards).
138 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from
Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 884-87 (describing the expansion of the criminal law and
the increasing power of prosecutors to decide which cases to take to trial); William J. Stuntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 519 (2001) (“Because criminal law is
broad, prosecutors cannot possibly enforce the law as written: there are too many violators. Broad
criminal law thus means that the law as enforced will differ from the law on the books.”).
139 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (“[T]he Executive Branch has exclusive
authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case.”); see also United States v.
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (describing prosecution as “a ‘special province’ of the
Executive” (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985))).
140 See Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832 (“[A]n agency’s refusal to institute proceedings shares to some
extent the characteristics of the decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict—a decision
which has long been regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the
Executive who is charged by the Constitution to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’”).
141 See generally Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA.
L. REV. 1835 (2016) (describing the Court’s simultaneous reliance on the clause as a source of vast
presidential power in some contexts and a sharp limitation in others).
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cases thus presents us with an opportunity to understand what the Court
perceives the obligation of faithful execution to entail.
1. Presumptions and Executive Discretion
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court has recognized that the decision not
to prosecute criminal wrongdoing “has long been regarded as the special
province of the Executive Branch.”142 In United States v. Armstrong, the Court
emphasized the “broad discretion” of United States Attorneys to decide how
to enforce federal criminal laws: “They have this latitude because they are
designated by statute as the President’s delegates to help him discharge his
constitutional responsibility to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.’”143 In examining the showing that a defendant must make before
being entitled to discovery on a claim of selective prosecution, the Armstrong
Court held that a “presumption of regularity” supports prosecutorial
decisions.144 A defendant pursuing a selective prosecution claim must present
“clear evidence” that an official has violated the Equal Protection Clause.145
Although one could argue that the Court’s ultimate holding derives from the
Equal Protection Clause rather than the Faithful Execution Clause,146 the
Court’s understanding of the discretion that the Faithful Execution Clause
entails informed the Court’s emphasis on the need for “clear” evidence to
trigger discovery requirements.
Heckler v. Chaney took a similar approach in the context of agency
enforcement discretion. In Chaney, state prison inmates sentenced to die by
lethal injection sued the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), claiming that
the states’ use of certain drugs for lethal injection violated the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), and that the law required the FDA to take
investigatory and enforcement actions to curb these violations.147 The Court
considered whether the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) permitted
judicial review of the FDA’s decision not to act.148 Under the APA, judicial
review is unavailable if, among other things, “agency action is committed to

142 Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832; see also Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (citing cases that held prosecutors
have “broad discretion to enforce the [n]ation’s criminal laws”); United States v. Batchelder, 442
U.S. 114, 124 (1979) (“Whether to prosecute and what charge to file . . . are decisions that generally
rest in the prosecutor’s discretion.”); Nixon, 418 U.S. at 693 (“[T]he Executive Branch has exclusive
authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case . . . .”).
143 517 U.S. at 464.
144 Id. (quoting United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926)).
145 Id. (quoting Chem. Found., 272 U.S. at 14-15).
146 See id. at 465 (“The requirements for a selective-prosecution claim draw on ‘ordinary equal
protection standards.’” (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985))).
147 See Chaney, 470 U.S. at 823-24 (describing the allegations).
148 Id. at 823.
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agency discretion by law.”149 The Court construed this provision to preclude
judicial review “even where Congress has not affirmatively precluded review”
in the substantive statute.150 If the statute is drawn “so that a court would have
no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of
discretion,” judicial review is unavailable.151 A plaintiff claiming that an
agency has improperly refused to undertake enforcement action must
overcome a presumption of unreviewability.152 Although Chaney involved
construction of the APA, the Faithful Execution Clause contributed to the
Court’s application of that statute to nonenforcement decisions:
[A]n agency’s refusal to institute proceedings shares to some extent the
characteristics of the decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to
indict—a decision which has long been regarded as the special providence of
the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who is charged by the
Constitution to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”153

In sum, both Armstrong and Chaney relied in part on the Faithful
Execution Clause to endow executive nonenforcement decisions with
presumptions of regularity. Both cases also made clear that the presumptions
of regularity can be overcome—in Armstrong, by sufficient evidence of an
equal protection violation, and in Chaney, by evidence that an agency has
“‘consciously and expressly adopted a general policy’ that is so extreme as to
amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.”154 Although we
could understand the cases to suggest that constitutional violations and
statutory abdication are inconsistent with the obligation of faithful execution,
the cases do not flesh out that concept in any greater detail.
2. Removal Cases
The Supreme Court’s removal cases present a second context for exploring
the contours of the Faithful Execution Clause. As noted above, the Court has
invoked the Faithful Execution Clause in multiple contexts. In most of those
contexts, however, the Court’s discussion of the clause simply adds weight to a
holding adequately supported by another rationale.155 What distinguishes the
removal cases, and particularly the Court’s most recent case, Free Enterprise
149
150
151
152
153
154
155

5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2012).
Chaney, 470 U.S. at 830.
Id.
Id. at 832-33.
Id. at 832.
Id. at 833 n.4 (quoting Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc)).
See, e.g., Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (relying on the Faithful
Execution Clause to buttress holding that plaintiff lacked standing); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
761 (1984) (same).
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Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB),156 is that the
Court’s holding cannot be explained without relying on the Faithful Execution
Clause. The removal cases thus may provide more insight into the scope of the
Faithful Execution Clause than cases that consider the clause in other contexts.
Below, I first survey the landscape of removal cases to show that certain aspects
of the Court’s removal cases can only be explained with reference to the Faithful
Execution Clause. I then build upon this understanding of the removal cases
to suggest some tentative conclusions about the obligation of faithful execution.
To help understand the role that Article II—and particularly the Faithful
Execution Clause—plays in the removal cases, we can identify three possible
connections between Article II and the removal power. First, Article II vests
the “executive Power” in the President.157 As discussed earlier, scholars have
long debated the significance and scope of that grant.158 For present purposes,
the question is whether the “executive Power” itself encompasses a power to
remove executive officials—that is, whether a removal power is part and
parcel of the “executive Power” that the Constitution grants to the President.
Second, Article II imposes on the President the obligation to “take care that
the Laws be faithfully executed.”159 Although the clause imposes an obligation
on the President rather than granting a power to him, it is a well-settled rule
of construction that an obligation carries with it whatever powers are
necessary to fulfill the obligation.160 Thus, the obligation to ensure faithful
execution of the laws may imply a power to remove executive officials when
their removal is required to fulfill the obligation. Third, one might argue that
even if the Faithful Execution Clause did not exist, the vesting of the
“executive Power” in the President would itself oblige the President to ensure
faithful execution of the laws. That is, the “executive Power” demands faithful
execution of the laws, and implies whatever power of removal is necessary to
ensure faithful execution. Because the second and third theories of removal—
under which an obligation of faithful execution (whether textually drawn or
implied) gives rise to a removal power—are likely to produce removal powers
of similar scope, I discuss the third theory only where the Court’s reference
to the “executive Power” appears to rest specifically on that theory.
The Court’s most forceful statements about an Article II-based removal
authority appear in Myers v. United States,161 a case involving a statute
156
157
158
159
160

561 U.S. 477 (2010).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
See supra Section III.A.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
See Manning, supra note 103, at 2036 (describing “well-settled rules of implication”
suggesting that “the imposition of a duty implicitly connotes a grant of power minimally sufficient
to see that duty fulfilled”).
161 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
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requiring senatorial advice and consent for the removal of a postmaster
during a four-year term in office.162 The President had removed Myers
without senatorial consent from his position as first-class postmaster.163
Myers sued for the salary allegedly owed to him from the time of his removal
to the expiration of his four-year term.164
In rejecting Myers’s claim, and affirming the President’s power to remove
Myers at will, the Supreme Court focused on the first two aspects of Article
II discussed above. That is, the Court explored both whether the executive
power that Article II confers on the President encompasses an authority to
remove executive officials165 and whether the obligation of faithful execution
entails such authority.166 The Court’s discussion drew heavily upon Foundingera evidence of the scope of Article II, including the extensive debates
preceding the First Congress’s creation of key executive departments in
1789.167 The Myers Court focused in part on James Madison’s argument that
the executive power includes a power of removal. According to the Court,
Madison “insisted” that Article II’s vesting of “the executive power in the
President was intended to grant to him the power of appointment and
removal of executive officers except as thereafter expressly provided in that
Article.”168 The Court also linked the removal power to the obligation of
faithful execution:
As [the President] is charged specifically to take care that [the laws] be faithfully
executed, the reasonable implication, even in the absence of express words, was
that as part of his executive power he should select those who were to act for
him under his direction in the execution of the laws.169

Drawing upon the debates in the First Congress, the Court stated,
Mr. Madison and his associates pointed out with great force the unreasonable
character of the view that the Convention intended, without express provision,
to give to Congress or the Senate, in case of political or other differences, the
162 See Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 179, § 6, 19 Stat. 78, 80 (“Postmasters of the first, second, and third classes
shall be appointed and may be removed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
and shall hold their offices for four years unless sooner removed or suspended according to law . . . .”).
163 Myers, 272 U.S. at 106.
164 Id.
165 See Bellia, supra note 103, at 1395-96 (summarizing the Myers Court’s use of historical
evidence to determine the scope of the President’s removal power).
166 See id. at 1396-97 (describing Myers’ conclusions about the President’s responsibilities to
faithfully execute the law).
167 Myers, 272 U.S. at 115-17. I have examined elsewhere the controversy over whether the
actions of the First Congress indeed signal a “Decision of 1789” on the scope of presidential removal
authority. See Bellia, supra note 102, at 1377-89.
168 Myers, 272 U.S. at 115.
169 Id. at 117.

1782

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 164: 1753

means of thwarting the Executive . . . by fastening upon him, as subordinate
executive officers, men who by their inefficient service under him, by their lack
of loyalty to the service, or by their different views of policy, might make his
taking care that the laws be faithfully executed most difficult or impossible.170

The Faithful Execution clause thus “confirmed” the Court’s conclusion that
the President must have the power to remove those who assist him in
execution of the laws.171 To hold that the President lacked such a power would
“make it impossible for the President, in case of political or other difference
with the Senate or Congress, to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.”172 The Court acknowledged that officers will sometimes be acting
in furtherance of the President’s discretionary duties and sometimes will be
pursuing statutorily assigned duties.173 Even in the latter case, however, the
President must be able to “properly supervise” officers’ “construction of the
statutes under which they act in order to secure . . . unitary and uniform
execution of the laws.”174 Thus, not only disloyalty or inefficiency, but also
refusal to follow presidential direction on matters of statutory interpretation,
would give rise to grounds for removal.
Although it is not possible to isolate the strands of the Myers case involving
the Faithful Execution Clause from those involving the Vesting Clause, one
could argue that the connection Myers draws between the removal power and
faithful execution provides some insight into what faithful execution means.
That is, if faithful execution demands that the President have the power to
remove an official who refuses to follow presidential direction or who exhibits
inefficiency or disloyalty, then faithful service entails acceptance of presidential
direction, competence, and loyalty.
In subsequent cases, however, the Court narrowed the Myers decision,
without fully exploring the continued validity of either of the potential
theories underpinning that decision. First, in Humphrey’s Executor v. United
States,175 the Court upheld a provision of the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) Act limiting the President’s removal of FTC Commissioners to cases
of “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”176 At the time of
the decision, the FTC exercised considerable enforcement powers—powers
170
171

Id. at 131.
See id. at 163-64 (“Article II grants to the President the executive power of the Government,
i.e., the general administrative control of those executing the laws, including the power of
appointment and removal of executive officers—a conclusion confirmed by his obligation to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed . . . .”).
172 Id. at 164.
173 Id. at 134-35.
174 Id. at 135.
175 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
176 Id. at 622.
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that today would be considered executive.177 The FTC also performed
adjudicative (what the Court termed “quasi-judicial”) functions.178 Because
the FTC Commissioners performed at least some executive functions, and
the Court sustained a for-cause removal provision, Humphrey’s Executor is
inconsistent with a theory that the “executive Power” includes unfettered
removal authority of all officers exercising any executive authority. Although
the Court in Humphrey’s Executor did not specifically discuss the Faithful
Execution Clause, the decision suggests that, in a case involving an officer
with adjudicative functions, any removal power that the duty of faithful
execution implies is not inconsistent with a good cause restriction on removal.
That is, Humphrey’s Executor implies that where adjudicative functions are
involved, unfettered presidential removal authority is not necessary for
faithful execution of the laws. To the extent that Myers interprets the Faithful
Execution Clause to encompass a presidential power to remove officials at
will, Humphrey’s Executor clarifies that any such power extends only to officials
who engage in purely executive functions.179
Similarly, in Wiener v. United States,180 the Court confirmed that Humphrey’s
Executor drew “a sharp line of cleavage” between purely executive officials,
removable by virtue of the President’s constitutional powers, and “those whose
tasks require absolute freedom from Executive interference.”181 The Court
characterized the War Claims Commission—a body responsible for
adjudicating claims by individuals who suffered injury or property damage at
the hands of the enemy in connection with World War II—as requiring that
freedom from interference.182 Indeed, in Wiener the Court inferred a goodcause limitation on presidential removal of members of the War Claims
Commission even though the underlying statute was silent on the question of
removal.183 One could read Wiener to create a default presumption that, in the
case of an adjudicative body like the War Claims Commission, the President
cannot remove an official without cause unless Congress so specifies. Wiener,

177 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689 n.28 (1988) (“[I]t is hard to dispute that the powers
of the FTC at the time of Humphrey’s Executor would at the present time be considered ‘executive,’
at least to some degree.”).
178 Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 629.
179 See id. at 627-28 (“[T]he necessary reach of [Myers] goes far enough to include all purely
executive officers. It goes no farther . . . .”).
180 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
181 Id. at 353.
182 Id.
183 See id. at 356 (“[N]o such power is given to the President directly by the Constitution, and
none is impliedly conferred upon him by statute simply because Congress said nothing about it.”).
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like Humphrey’s Executor, thus implies that a for-cause removal power satisfies
the President’s obligation of faithful execution.184
Although the holdings of Humphrey’s Executor and Wiener went only so far
as to suggest that a presidential power to remove officers at will did not
extend to officers with adjudicative functions (or those who did not engage
in purely executive functions), the next significant removal case, Morrison v.
Olson, jettisoned that limitation. In Morrison, the Court sustained Congress’s
creation of the Office of Independent Counsel.185 The statute provided that
an independent counsel could be removed, “other than by impeachment and
conviction, only by the personal action of the Attorney General and only for
good cause, physical disability, mental incapacity, or any other condition that
substantially impairs the performance of such independent counsel’s
duties.”186 As the Court acknowledged, the Independent Counsel’s functions
were purely executive.187 While recognizing that Humphrey’s Executor and
Wiener had upheld removal restrictions on the ground that the functions of
the officers in question were not purely executive, the Court stated that its
“present considered view” was that “the determination of whether the
Constitution allows Congress to impose a ‘good cause’-type restriction on the
President’s power to remove an official cannot be made to turn on whether or
not that official is classified as ‘purely executive.’”188
The Court then invoked the Faithful Execution Clause. The
constitutionality of the for-cause restriction on removal of the independent
counsel, the Court reasoned, turned on whether the restriction would “impede
the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty”189—that is, his
“exercise of the ‘executive power’ and his constitutionally appointed duty to
‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed’ under Article II.”190 The Court
concluded that a for-cause limitation on the Attorney General’s ability to
remove the Independent Counsel did not “sufficiently deprive[] the President

184 Although the Wiener Court discussed a sphere in which “a power of removal exists only if
Congress may fairly be said to have conferred it,” id. at 353, the Court appears to have been referring
to a power to remove officials at will. That is, in the case of adjudicative bodies, the Court created a
presumption against removal at will, but it did not suggest that a for-cause removal power exists
only if Congress confers it.
185 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 682-83 (1988).
186 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (1982).
187 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691 (“There is no real dispute that the functions performed by the
independent counsel are ‘executive’ in the sense that they are law enforcement functions that
typically have been undertaken by officials within the Executive Branch.”).
188 Id. at 689.
189 Id. at 691.
190 Id. at 690.
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of control over the independent counsel to interfere impermissibly with his
constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the laws.”191
Although the Morrison Court invoked both the President’s executive
power and the President’s duty of faithful execution, its discussion did little
to clarify the relationship between the two. The Court did not treat the
removal power as a constituent element of the executive power, and the
Court’s holding is inconsistent with the view that the executive power itself
entails the power to remove all officials who exercise purely executive powers.
The Court appeared instead to treat the executive power as generating a duty
parallel to that of the Faithful Execution Clause. In the case of the
independent counsel, as with the adjudicative officers at issue in Humphrey’s
Executor and Wiener, the Court determined that a for-cause limitation on
removal would not interfere with the duty of faithful execution. Indeed, the
Court went so far as to imply that the President can ensure faithful execution
of the laws so long as a statute does not “completely strip[]” the President’s
power to remove an official performing executive functions.192 The Court
found the duty of faithful execution satisfied where the for-cause removal
provision preserved for the President “ample authority to assure that the
counsel is competently performing his or her statutory responsibilities in a
manner that comports with the provisions” of the Ethics in Government Act,
the statute at issue in that case.193
Finally, in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board,194 the Supreme Court invalidated a statutory provision protecting the
tenure of members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB), a board created to oversee the auditing of public companies
subject to securities regulation.195 PCAOB members could be removed only
if the SEC, after notice and an opportunity for a hearing, found “good cause”
as defined in the underlying statute, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.196
Because members of the SEC are themselves removable only for cause,197 the
Court had to consider whether the Constitution permits Congress to insulate
officials from removal with two layers of for-cause protection. The Court held
that the two levels of tenure protection for PCAOB members rendered the
PCAOB’s structure unconstitutional.198
191
192
193
194
195
196
197

Id. at 693.
Id. at 692.
Id.
561 U.S. 477 (2010).
Id. at 491.
15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(6) (2012).
Or so the Court assumed, based on the stipulations of the parties. See Bellia, supra note 103,
at 1372 n.4 (noting the parties agreed that members of the SEC can only be removed for cause,
“despite statutory silence on this point”).
198 Free Enter., 561 U.S. at 491.
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Free Enterprise is important to our understanding of the Faithful
Execution Clause for two reasons. First, the Court explicitly relied on the
Faithful Execution Clause to reject the PCAOB’s structure. Second, although
the Court also purported to rest its decision in part on the “executive Power”
the Constitution vests in the President, the Vesting Clause cannot account
for the Court’s ultimate holding—making the Court’s reliance on the Faithful
Execution Clause all the more important.
To understand why the Vesting Clause cannot account for the Court’s
decision, we must measure the Court’s holding in relation to the Court’s
broad statements about the executive power. The Free Enterprise Court
bookended its discussion of the removal issue with references to the Vesting
Clause. Relying on the statements of James Madison during the debates in
the First Congress over creation of the executive departments, the Court
repeatedly observed that the removal power is an element of the executive
power.199 As I have argued elsewhere, however, the Court’s reliance on the
executive power in Free Enterprise was more rhetorical than substantive.200 In
rejecting the dual for-cause removal structure of the PCAOB, the Court read
the Constitution to demand that the SEC have unlimited authority to remove
members of the PCAOB. The Court did not explain why the executive power
might demand unlimited removal authority for tenure-protected individuals,
but not for the President. If the Vesting Clause truly encompassed an
unlimited authority to remove executive officials, that rule would necessarily
run upward and demand that the President have the power to remove SEC
Commissioners at will. Because the Court severed the provisions restricting
the SEC’s authority to remove PCAOB members and then sustained the
constitutionality of the statutory scheme,201 the Court necessarily (though
implicitly) validated the for-cause removal restriction on members of the
SEC. In short, despite the fact that the Court repeatedly relied on the Vesting
Clause as the source of a presidential power to supervise or remove executive
officials, the Court’s limited holding is not consistent with that clause.
The Faithful Execution Clause thus takes on greater significance in Free
Enterprise, as the only case in which the Court invalidated a removal
restriction and could not have done so solely on the basis of the Vesting
Clause. The Court noted that the duty of faithful execution implies a power
199 See, e.g., id. at 492 (quoting an account of James Madison’s statement that “if any power
whatsoever is in its nature Executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those
who execute the laws”); id. (attributing to the First Congress a prevailing view that “the executive
power included a power to oversee executive officers through removal”); id. (describing removal as a
“traditional executive power”); id. at 513-14 (stating that the executive power “includes, as a general
matter, the authority to remove those who assist him in carrying out his duties”).
200 Bellia, supra note 103, at 1406.
201 Free Enter., 561 U.S. at 508-10.
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of oversight of executive officials: “The President cannot ‘take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed’ if he cannot oversee the faithfulness of the
officers who execute them.”202 Because it is “his responsibility to take care that
the laws be faithfully executed,” the President “must have some ‘power of
removing those for whom he can not continue to be responsible.’”203 Turning
specifically to the PCAOB’s dual for-cause removal requirement, the Court
observed that the President’s inability to act upon a determination that
“Board members are abusing their offices or neglecting their duties” means
that the President “can neither ensure that the laws are faithfully executed,
nor be held responsible for a Board member’s breach of faith.”204
The Faithful Execution Clause provides a much more promising basis for the
Free Enterprise holding than does the Vesting Clause.205 Although the Court did
not state precisely what removal power the President must possess to fulfill his
duty of faithful execution, the fact that the Court upheld one layer of for-cause
removal for the SEC suggests a presumption that for-cause removal restrictions
in the case of an agency with functions and authorities similar to the SEC or the
PCAOB (or, for that matter, the agencies and officials at issue in Humphrey’s
Executive, Wiener, and Morrison) suffices. The for-cause removal provisions vary
by agency, but some of the common elements include inefficiency, neglect of
duty, misconduct, malfeasance, abuse of authority, and failure to observe the
law.206 Thus, the removal cases suggest that to ensure faithful execution, the
President must demand fidelity to law, competence, and abstention from
improper conduct. At the same time, it is well understood that with respect to
agencies whose officers typically enjoy for-cause tenure protection, a reasonable
disagreement about the law does not provide the basis for removal.

202
203
204
205

Id. at 484.
Id. at 493 (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 117 (1926)).
Id. at 496.
The Court also relied on two structural separation of powers principles, untethered to specific
constitutional text: concerns about presidential accountability and fears of congressional aggrandizement
at the expense of executive power. For discussion, see Bellia, supra note 103, at 1409-10.
206 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2012) (Federal Trade Commission) (“Any Commissioner may be
removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”); id. § 2053(a)
(Consumer Product Safety Commission) (“Any member of the Commission may be removed by the
President for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office but for no other cause.”); 42 U.S.C. § 7171(b)(1)
(2012) (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) (“Members shall hold office for a term of 5 years
and may be removed by the President only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
office.”); 46 U.S.C. § 301(b)(5) (2012) (Federal Maritime Commission) (“The President may remove
a Commissioner for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”); see also 15 U.S.C.
§ 7217(d)(3) (setting forth the provision invalidated in Free Enterprise, which limited removal of
PCAOB members to abuse of authority, violation of law, or failure to enforce compliance).

1788

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 164: 1753

D. Summary
As the discussion above suggests, the courts have done little to moderate the
discretion-granting and discretion-limiting aspects of the Faithful Execution
Clause. The constitutional background suggests that the Founders rejected a
suspension power, whether or not the Faithful Execution Clause itself embodied
that rejection. If so, faithful execution cannot encompass a power to disregard
entirely a duly enacted law, other than on constitutional grounds. The early
constitutional history also suggests that faithful execution encompasses a power
not to pursue particular offenders, based on innocence or considerations of justice
and equity in particular cases. The challenge is to identify a constitutional tipping
point somewhere between these two poles—at one end, a concept of enforcement
that requires action except in individual cases dictated by considerations of
justices and equity; at the other end, a concept of enforcement that permits
executive discretion up to the point of suspension.
The removal cases shed some light on this tipping point. They imply that
to fulfill his duty of faithful execution, the President must demand executive
officials’ fidelity to the law. Yet those cases also suggest that with respect to
officials whose tenure the Constitution permits Congress to protect with a
for-cause removal provision, the President cannot treat a reasonable
disagreement about the law as a trigger for removal. If so, then ensuring
faithful execution requires the President to ensure a good-faith, reasonable
interpretation of the law. Beyond that, any number of actions undertaken in
bad faith would satisfy the sort of for-cause requirements that the Court has
concluded are sufficient to preserve the President’s faithful execution duty.
With this backdrop in mind, we can flesh out what the President’s duty to
take care that the laws be faithfully executed requires. The President must act
in good faith in executing the law. He also must ensure that other executive
officials do so, by demanding their fidelity to law, competence, and abstention
from improper conduct. Returning to the first institutional question addressed
at the beginning of this Part, the Faithful Execution Clause does not itself
preclude (and is not, without more, violated by) a bad-faith act by a subordinate
executive official. Rather, the Faithful Execution Clause protects the
President’s ability to respond to acts of bad faith, and indeed requires the
President to do so, or to ensure that there exists an executive branch structure
to respond effectively to acts of bad faith.
Depending on the context for executive action, good faith will have
different elements. Suspending or dispensing with a statute is outside the
bounds of good faith. As for enforcement discretion, the constitutional
structure clearly permits such discretion for reasons of justice and equity in
individual cases. Beyond that, if an exercise of discretion is to constitute
faithful execution of the law, it must be tethered to a good-faith interpretation
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of the underlying statute. The next Part fleshes out these issues through an
evaluation of OLC’s DAPA opinion.
IV. BEYOND THE OLC FRAMEWORK
As summarized in Part II, OLC evaluated a proposal to extend deferred
action to the parents of citizens and lawful permanent residents and a proposal
to extend deferred action to the parents of DACA beneficiaries. Applying the
four principles it developed to evaluate exercises of enforcement discretion,
OLC declared the former proposal lawful and the latter proposal unlawful.
Although the debate over DAPA’s legality moved to the courts, the OLC
framework may prove important in future evaluations of executive conduct.
Justiciability limitations inevitably constrain judicial superintendence of
faithful execution of the law. If executive self-policing and legislative oversight
are the primary mechanisms for gauging executive enforcement of the law,
then it becomes critical to evaluate the mechanisms by which the executive
judges its own conduct. For our purposes, that evaluation encompasses two
(sometimes overlapping) questions: how well suited is OLC’s framework to
reining exercises of enforcement discretion, and how well does OLC apply that
framework to DAPA?
A. Unreasonable Versus Unconstitutional Exercises of
Enforcement Discretion
Before evaluating the elements of OLC’s framework, we must first clarify
whether OLC’s analysis of DAPA was about faithful execution at all. Recall that
the OLC framework embedded four principles: that enforcement decisions
should reflect factors peculiarly within the agency’s expertise; that an agency
cannot rewrite laws to match its policy preferences; that an agency cannot adopt
a nonenforcement policy so extreme as to amount to statutory abdication; and
that an agency generally cannot foreclose case-by-case discretion.207
OLC’s second and third principles call for measuring the degree of
substantive fit between an enforcement policy and the underlying statute. In
seeking to identify whether DHS was rewriting the laws to match its policy
preference and whether DAPA reflected an extreme nonenforcement policy,
OLC tested whether DAPA conformed to congressional priorities and
limitations reflected in the INA. OLC’s approach was somewhat analogous
to the analysis an agency or a court might conduct in determining if a
particular interpretation of a statute is correct. An agency’s analysis might
differ from that of a court evaluating an agency’s interpretation: whereas an
207

See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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agency’s task is to seek the best meaning of the statute, the court’s task—
depending on the scope of Congress’s delegation to the agency and the form
of the agency’s interpretation—may be to accept a reasonable interpretation
of the statute.208 In either case, however, the agency or court looks to the
statute to assess its meaning, and a policy that is inconsistent with the statute
or that is unreasonable is unlawful.
Despite some similarities between OLC’s analysis and the typical analysis
of a question of statutory interpretation, I read the OLC opinion as driven
by a concern about unconstitutionality as well as, or rather than, a concern
about statutory interpretation or unreasonableness. OLC focused on the
concept of “faithful[] execut[ion]” in critical segments of the framework it
laid out and in its application of that framework to DAPA. As will become
clear, moreover, OLC’s assessment of the substantive fit between the
enforcement program and the statutory scheme gave the executive branch
extremely wide berth—an approach that is more consistent with a
constitutional focus.209
The observation that OLC’s framework seems to operate within the realm
of constitutional law rather than ordinary law highlights a difficulty with
OLC’s approach to evaluating DAPA—that OLC’s analysis neglected the
ordinary law layer. OLC’s characterization of DAPA as an exercise of
enforcement discretion set OLC on a path of evaluating the consistency of
that policy with the President’s faithful execution duty, rather than more
directly evaluating the policy’s consistency with the INA. The inquiries
overlap, but not entirely. The President’s duty of faithful execution demands
that he ensure executive officials’ fidelity to law. In some contexts he must
countenance a good-faith disagreement about the meaning of the law, and in
other contexts he cannot do so. But even under the most demanding
construction of the Faithful Execution Clause, the clause tolerates some
degree of mismatch between congressional priorities and an executive
enforcement policy. The executive agency’s task, as noted earlier, is to arrive
at the best construction of a statute. Although an unreasonable interpretation
of a statute is an unlawful one, we would not, without more, characterize an
unreasonable interpretation as a violation of the President’s duty of faithful
execution. If every failed instance of statutory interpretation by the executive
branch does not trigger a constitutional claim, it follows that we must address
208 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (holding
that where Congress has explicitly or implicitly left a statutory gap for an agency to fill, “a court
may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made
by the administrator of an agency”); see also United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001) (holding
that Chevron deference applies only where there are indicia that Congress “would expect the agency
to be able to speak with the force of law”).
209 See infra Section IV.C.
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questions of a policy’s fidelity to an underlying statute even when a mismatch
between the policy and the statute would not implicate the Faithful Execution
Clause. Any other approach threatens to constitutionalize a range of
questions that we currently treat as being within the realm of “ordinary” law.
The concept of enforcement discretion provides space for the Executive
to make reasonable enforcement choices within a range reflected in the
operative statute. The Constitution also provides space for the Executive to
make good-faith, but perhaps mistaken or unreasonable, choices. Heckler v.
Chaney suggests a limited role for courts in evaluating the latter space.210 The
executive branch, however, must evaluate enforcement discretion in this
space: it must assess whether its enforcement priorities align with the
statutory scheme, and not simply whether any deviation is so extreme as to
amount to a constitutional violation. The OLC framework appears to collapse
these two inquiries. Although OLC dedicated significant time to assessing
the fit between DAPA and the INA, its orientation toward constitutional
limits may introduce too much elasticity into the analysis. Section C
addresses this issue in greater depth. For now, it is sufficient to note that OLC
seems to miss the ordinary law layer.
A second difficulty with OLC’s framework is that the Faithful Execution
Clause does not pose the only relevant constitutional limitation on executive
authority. The President’s adoption of a policy that is not grounded in his
constitutional or statutory authority is inconsistent with separation-ofpowers principles, even if the policy was not adopted in bad faith.211 Whether
or not the Faithful Execution Clause captures this concept of congressional
policymaking supremacy, it is not clear that the OLC framework does so. As
discussed in Section IV.B, the OLC framework does demand a substantive fit
between DAPA and congressional policies reflected in the INA. OLC’s focus
on general congressional priorities, however, as distinct from the specific
statutory provisions that embody those principles, has the potential to mask
significant deviations from the statutory scheme.
B. Evaluating the OLC Framework
I now turn to the elements that OLC’s enforcement discretion framework
does include, and ask whether the framework sufficiently captures the
requirements of the Faithful Execution Clause. There are at least two
different ways to understand how the OLC framework refines the concept of
faithful execution.
210 470 U.S. 821, 833 (1985) (recognizing a presumption of unreviewability with respect to an
agency’s nonenforcement decisions).
211 See supra notes 114-115 and accompanying text (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)).
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On one view, OLC’s framework interpreted the Faithful Execution Clause
as demanding a substantive fit between congressional priorities and an executive
official’s exercise of enforcement discretion. As noted above, in various ways
the principles OLC articulated and applied to DAPA do reflect an effort to test
DAPA’s substantive fit with the policies embedded in the INA. The second
principle, for example, observes that an agency cannot, in effect, rewrite laws
to match its policy preferences.212 OLC’s third principle seeks to ensure that
an enforcement policy is not so extreme as to amount to an abdication of
statutory responsibilities. Both principles thus should foreclose significant
deviations from the underlying statutory scheme.
In applying these principles to DAPA’s grant of forbearance from removal,
OLC sustained DAPA based in large part on its view that granting deferred
action to the parents of citizens and lawful permanent residents would be
consonant with the priorities OLC imputed to Congress: a concern for family
unity and a recognition that deferred action could appropriately serve as a
bridge to a lawful status to which DAPA beneficiaries are prospectively
entitled.213 Conversely, OLC rejected the extension of deferred action to the
parents of DACA beneficiaries because, in its view, Congress’s concern for
family unity did not apply when no family member had immediate or
prospective lawful status in the United States.214
Section C more closely examines OLC’s analysis of the relationship between
DAPA and the congressional priorities reflected in the INA. Whatever the
strengths and weaknesses of OLC’s evaluation of congressional priorities might
be, the point for now is that at least in some respects the OLC opinion links
faithful execution to fidelity to the statutory scheme. That is, the opinion suggests
that an enforcement policy untethered to or inconsistent with congressional
policy would be beyond the executive’s power of faithful execution.
On another view, OLC’s framework interprets the Faithful Execution
Clause as demanding that an agency pursue congressional policies in good
faith. Under this approach, the degree of substantive fit between the
enforcement policy and the governing statute provides clues about whether
an agency is acting in good faith, but is not decisive. Here, we might view
OLC’s four principles as a proxy for good faith. For example, evidence of an
agency basing enforcement decisions on factors outside its expertise may
constitute evidence that the agency is not attempting to be faithful to
Congress’s statutory scheme. Likewise, evidence of a lack of substantive fit
between the law Congress adopts and the Executive’s enforcement policy or
a policy so “extreme” as to amount to an abdication of statutory
212
213
214

OLC Opinion, supra note 10, at 6.
Id. at 26-28; see supra note 87 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
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responsibilities could serve as evidence of bad faith. A general policy of
nonenforcement—foreclosing case-by-case discretion—similarly serves as
evidence that the Executive is not seeking in good faith to enforce an existing
congressional scheme, but rather is using enforcement discretion as a
subterfuge to substitute its own judgment for that of Congress.
OLC did not clearly choose between these two models of faithful execution.
The fourth principle that OLC articulated—reflecting skepticism of exercises of
enforcement discretion incorporating categorical rules rather than case-by-case
discretion—perhaps fits better with a good-faith approach, because it seeks to
smoke out substantive policy differences masked as enforcement priorities.
Part III argued that the President’s duty to ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed requires both that the President act in good faith and that
he demand good faith, including fidelity to law, competence, and avoidance
of improper conduct on the part of his subordinates. To the extent that the
OLC framework embeds principles that can help ensure good-faith conduct
on the part of executive officials, it aligns well with what Part III’s assessment
of the Faithful Execution Clause requires.
One could argue, however, that a critical element of enforcement
discretion is underdeveloped in OLC’s framework. To evaluate the executive
branch’s exercise of enforcement discretion, we must ask whether the
discretion-granting side of the Faithful Execution Clause constrains the
grounds on which executive officials can decline to enforce the law. Structural
principles provide one affirmative basis for executive discretion: enforcement
discretion is available in individual cases for reasons of justice or equity.215
Beyond that, can executive officials decline to enforce the law for any reason
whatsoever, and if not, what constrains and guides enforcement discretion?
It should be obvious that a power to decline to enforce the law for any reason
quickly collapses into a suspension power. That is, if exercised across a class of
cases, the power to decline to enforce the law reflects a narrowing of the operative
statute. OLC did address this point by suggesting that categorical exercises of
enforcement discretion pose “special risks” of exceeding enforcement
discretion.216 OLC did not, however, offer a clear basis for delineating categorical
exercises of enforcement discretion from those that are not.217 Nor did OLC
demand that categorical exercises of discretion be grounded in, as opposed to
merely not inconsistent with, the underlying statute.

215
216
217

See supra notes 133-136 and accompanying text.
OLC Opinion, supra note 10, at 7.
OLC placed DAPA on the non-categorical side of the line, claiming that the program “provides
for the exercise of case-by-case discretion.” Id. at 31. But see Texas II, 809 F.3d 134, 176 (5th Cir. 2015)
(“Reviewing for clear error, we conclude that the states have established a substantial likelihood that DAPA
would not genuinely leave the agency and its employees free to exercise discretion.”).
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The intuition that categorical or class-based exercises of enforcement
discretion are more problematic than individual exercises of enforcement
discretion reflects a key distinction between the two: individual exercises of
enforcement discretion fit comfortably with structural principles regarding the
separation of legislative and executive functions, whereas categorical or classbased exercises of enforcement discretion require a justification in the underlying
statute. In many cases, it will indeed be possible to link a categorical exercise of
enforcement discretion to an underlying statute. With respect to deferred action,
for example, one could argue that removing certain aliens with an immediate or
near-immediate entitlement to lawful status would frustrate the purpose of the
provisions granting that lawful status. Deferred action for VAWA self-petitioners
or for victims of human trafficking and other violent crimes could be justified on
that basis.218 In other words, certain categorical exercises of enforcement
discretion will effectuate rather than undermine the underlying statute. In the
examples above, the threshold criteria for categorical exercises of deferred action
are linked to the statute: deferred action is not available unless the applicant
makes a preliminary showing that he or she satisfies the criteria for the visa to
which he or she claims a prospective entitlement.
It is, of course, exceedingly difficult to extract from a statute as complex as
the INA a clear and consistent set of priorities. In the next Section, I discuss these
difficulties with respect to the particular congressional priority that is claimed to
justify DAPA—maintaining family unity. One could approach these difficulties
in two ways: with a default presumption that categorical exercises of enforcement
discretion are impermissible absent a need to effectuate the purpose underlying
particular statutory provisions, or with a default presumption that categorical
exercises of enforcement discretion are permissible absent a clear statutory
provision precluding them. The choice between these two default presumptions
is a complicated one, but in practice OLC appeared to choose the latter approach
without significant discussion.219
In other words, DAPA’s extension of deferred action across a category of
unauthorized aliens is justified not as a tool to serve particular provisions of the
INA, but as a measure not inconsistent with one of the congressional priorities
generally reflected in the INA. In effect, OLC’s analytic framework implies
that categorical exercises of enforcement discretion need not derive from
specific statutory provisions. Despite the importance of that principle to OLC’s

218
219

See infra notes 234-235 and accompanying text.
OLC did state that “a general policy of non-enforcement that forecloses the exercise of
case-by-case discretion poses ‘special risks’ that the agency has exceeded the bounds of its
enforcement discretion.” OLC Opinion, supra note 10, at 7. OLC denied, however, that DAPA
creates “a categorical, rule-like entitlement to immigration relief for[] the particular class of aliens
eligible for the program.” Id. at 29.
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ultimate conclusion about DAPA’s legality, OLC never fully explored that
principle on the merits.
C. The OLC Framework in Application
Sections A and B of this Part focused on potential limitations of OLC’s
framework for evaluating nonenforcement decisions. Even if the framework
adequately tests whether an enforcement policy constitutes faithful execution
of the law, the application of the framework becomes critical. The failure to
closely scrutinize the relationship between DAPA and the INA, for example,
could lead to validation of a policy that rewrites the INA or amounts to
statutory abdication.
In this Section, I consider two aspects of OLC’s application of its
framework. The first concerns OLC’s treatment of multiple elements of DAPA
as exercises of enforcement discretion. Some of these elements, I argue, deserve
a separate legal analysis. The second concerns how OLC examined and
evaluated congressional priorities under the INA.
1. Enforcement Discretion and Collateral Consequences
OLC generally characterized DAPA as an exercise of enforcement
discretion. Even if we assume that OLC’s four principles provide the
appropriate framework for evaluating exercises of enforcement discretion, a
critical threshold question is whether different elements of DAPA truly
reflect an exercise of enforcement discretion.
There are multiple elements to DAPA: the establishment of criteria for
illegal aliens to seek deferred action;220 the decision to permit deferred action
recipients to seek work authorization;221 and the decision to treat a deferred
action beneficiary’s presence as “lawful.”222 In addition, a grant of deferred
action represents a decision not merely to decline to enforce the law against
past conduct, but also to tolerate a continued violation of the law.
Although these elements are closely tied to one another, each deserves
separate treatment. The decision to permit deferred action recipients to seek
work authorization, for example, is not a nonenforcement decision at all. The
decision to allow an illegal alien to seek work authorization may be a logical
consequence of a nonenforcement decision, but the framework for evaluating
enforcement discretion has no application to it. OLC implicitly acknowledged as
much, by defending the grant of permission to seek work authorization as being
“grounded in” section 274A(h)(3) of the INA, rather than in “background
220
221
222

See supra Section I.A.
See supra Section I.B.2.
See supra Section I.B.1.
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principles of agency discretion” or the Faithful Execution Clause.223 Determining
whether section 274A(h)(3) in fact confers on DHS the authority to grant work
authorization to all deferred action recipients requires interpretation of that
provision. Issues include whether the provision authorizes the grant of work
authorization or merely acknowledges powers to grant work authorization that
exist elsewhere in the INA; how to interpret a past history of granting work
authorization to deferred action recipients (albeit in much smaller numbers); and
whether recognizing DHS’s authority to grant work authorization to DAPA
beneficiaries undercuts any purpose Congress may have had to deter illegal
immigration by restricting employment of unauthorized aliens.224
Similarly, the fact that deferred action leads executive officials to tolerate
a continued violation of the law raises complex questions that go beyond
enforcement discretion. One could view the decision not to apply the INA’s
removal provision as an exercise of enforcement discretion. But is tolerating
a continued violation of the law simply a logical consequence of the
nonenforcement decision? Or is tolerating a continued violation of the law an
act ancillary to the Executive’s enforcement of separate provisions that
contemplate a future lawful status?
Notice how dramatically the analysis changes depending on how we frame
the question. If we view tolerating a continued violation of the law as part of
the decision to forbear removal, then the history of executive officials’ use of
deferred action (or other nonstatutory forms of discretionary relief), and
Congress’s acknowledgment of executive practice, support the legality of
executive conduct. The question becomes much closer if tolerating a
continued violation of the law is ancillary to the executive branch’s
enforcement of other provisions of the INA granting lawful status. The
government has defended past instances of deferred action as a bridge to
lawful status.225 One could argue that the more remote the transition to lawful
status is, the harder it is to characterize executive officials’ tolerance of
continued violation of the law as an authority ancillary to enforcement of
provisions under which an alien may adjust to lawful status, as opposed to a
new path to lawful status.
2. Measuring DAPA Against the INA
Second, to the extent that OLC applied its enforcement discretion
framework to test the substantive fit between DAPA and the INA, that
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OLC Opinion, supra note 10, at 21; see supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 233-235 and accompanying text.
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application demonstrates the malleability of the framework. Here, two
aspects of OLC’s analysis are worth evaluating.
a. The Role of Congressional Inaction and Implied Approval
The first aspect concerns how past instances of deferred action influenced
OLC’s understanding of congressional priorities. OLC’s assessment of
whether DAPA is consonant with congressional policy turned heavily on past
congressional approval of deferred action. OLC characterized deferred action
as “a regular feature of the immigration removal system that has been
acknowledged by both Congress and the Supreme Court.”226 After reviewing
five class-based exercises of deferred action,227 OLC opined that “Congress
has long been aware of the practice of granting deferred action, including in
its categorical variety, and of its salient features; and it has never acted to
disapprove or limit the practice.”228 In fact, OLC found, Congress has enacted
legislation that assumes deferred action will be available to certain aliens, and
has directed that deferred action be made available to others.229 OLC
extrapolated from this congressional awareness of deferred action to find
implicit congressional approval of an extension of deferred action through
DAPA. In particular, OLC found that the extension of deferred action to the
parents of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents would “use[] deferred
action as an interim measure for a group of aliens to whom Congress has
given a prospective entitlement to lawful immigration status.”230
The difficulties with OLC’s approach are both conceptual and contextspecific. On a conceptual level, OLC conflated evidence of congressional
acknowledgment of past deferred action programs with congressional failure
to disapprove such programs, and treated both as a form of implied approval.
I have discussed elsewhere the malleability of the concept of implied
congressional approval, including how it both extends presidential power and
circumscribes the opportunity to explore—and limit—the contours of the
President’s constitutional powers.231 Aside from the problems that flow from
relying on Congress’s failure to act as a sign of congressional approval in any
context, the approach presents particular problems with a recurring issue such
as deferred action. When congressional silence is construed as tacit approval
of the Executive’s approach, Congress’s failure to act works a constant
expansion of executive authority. The reliance on DACA as a precedent for
226
227
228
229
230
231

OLC Opinion, supra note 10, at 13.
See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text.
OLC Opinion, supra note 10, at 18.
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Id. at 29.
Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown’s Shadows, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 87, 142-44 (2002).
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DAPA is a case in point. OLC did not fully defend DACA,232 and it likely
could not have done so on the theory that it espoused with respect to DAPA
(that of preventing removal of one with a prospective entitlement to lawful
immigration status). Yet on OLC’s view, Congress’s failure to disapprove
DACA, among other deferred action measures, provides evidence of
congressional approval.
Turning to the specific case of implied congressional approval of deferred
action, the evidence that Congress has approved certain narrow uses of
deferred action—mostly by implication—is compelling. OLC, however,
moved quickly from this evidence to the assumption that Congress would
approve far broader uses of deferred action. The key to OLC’s analysis was
that Congress has impliedly approved exercises of deferred action to act as a
bridge to prevent removal of an individual with a prospective entitlement to
lawful immigration status. OLC did not, however, consider the varied nature
of the prospective entitlement under DAPA and prior programs.
The pre-DACA programs that OLC cited involve immigrants currently
entitled to lawful status, or immigrants with an entitlement to lawful status far
more definite and immediate than that involved in DAPA. A DAPA
beneficiary’s path to lawful status in most cases would depend on the age and
status of his or her children. As noted earlier, U.S. citizens over the age of
twenty-one can petition for visas for their parents.233 Lawful permanent
residents cannot do so unless they themselves become citizens. In both cases,
any “entitlement” to lawful status lacks immediacy and certainty. By contrast,
VAWA self-petitioners can adjust to legal status as soon as a visa becomes
available.234 For victims of human trafficking and other forms of violence
covered in certain visa programs, deferred action is available only once the
applicant has, at a minimum, made a prima facie showing that he or she is
eligible for lawful status.235 In short, one cannot rely on implied congressional
approval of programs involving immediate or near-immediate entitlement to
lawful status to draw inferences about congressional approval of programs
involving more distant or less definite entitlement to prospective lawful status.
232 See OLC Opinion, supra note 10, at 18 n.8 (noting that extending deferred action on “a
class-wide basis would raise distinct questions not implicated by ad hoc grants of deferred action,”
and explaining that it is critical to the program’s legality that “immigration officials retain[]
discretion to evaluate each application on an individualized basis”).
233 See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
234 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a) (2012).
235 See 8 C.F.R. § 214.11(b) (setting forth evidence required for eligibility for visa program); id.
§ 214.14(d)(2) (authorizing the grant of deferred action to “eligible petitioners” for the “U” visa program,
applicable to individuals who have suffered substantial physical or mental abuse as victims of certain
crimes); id. § 214.11(k)(1) (setting forth the requirements of prima facie evidence, which entitles applicants
to an automatic stay of removal); id. § 214.11(m)(2) (2015) (recognizing deferred action as one mechanism
to prevent removal of an “eligible applicant” to the “T” visa program for victims of human trafficking).
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b. Identifying Congressional Priorities
The second and perhaps broader problem arises from the level of
generality at which OLC identified congressional priorities. OLC’s account
of DAPA’s fidelity to a congressional policy of preserving family unity may
be overstated. The INA unquestionably reflects a concern for achieving and
maintaining family unity. As noted earlier, the statute permits citizens to
petition for immediate-relative visas on behalf of qualifying family members,
including parents.236 What significance, however, should we attach to the
limitations the INA imposes—that a citizen must be twenty-one or older
before she can petition for a visa on behalf of a parent,237 and that aliens who
accrue unlawful presence are subject to a three-year, ten-year, or permanent
bar on admission?238 And to the extent that the INA explicitly provides for
relief from removal based on a family relationship, it severely restricts the
availability of such relief to 4,000 cancellations per year239 in cases in which
“removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to the
child.240 It is difficult to see how the absence of a hardship standard or
numerical cap in the DAPA context can be squared with these provisions.
In short, depending on the level of generality at which we view the INA, we
could find—to employ the framework of Justice Jackson’s Youngstown
concurrence—either implied approval or implied disapproval of DHS’s action.241
At a high level of generality, we can indeed detect a priority to maintain family
unity. At the same time, DHS clearly could not grant parents of citizens or lawful
permanent residents a lawful immigration status in the face of specific provisions
restricting such relief. Even if Congress did not specifically disallow more limited
relief, we might view the narrow provisions outlining a path for parents of citizens
and lawful permanent residents as, in a sense, occupying the field and thus
signaling Congress’s implied disapproval of DHS’s action.242
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See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(e)(1).
Id. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-39 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
One could argue that the concurring justices in the Youngstown case took precisely this
approach, finding that President Truman was not authorized to seize the steel mills because, in view
of statutory provisions not directly applicable to the situation President Truman faced, Congress
had impliedly disapproved of the President’s course of conduct. See, e.g., Bellia, supra note 231, at
100-02 (describing the concurring Justices’ reliance on statutory alternatives); id. at 140 (“In effect,
the concurring Justices found that Congress had occupied the field, thereby blocking the course of
conduct President Truman chose to pursue.”).
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CONCLUSION
DAPA seeks to respond to an exceedingly difficult problem—one with
compelling humanitarian dimensions. The questions of executive power that
DAPA raises are also exceedingly difficult. Those questions will continue to
recur outside of the immigration context and will endure long after the battle
over DAPA’s legality is resolved. With respect to enforcement discretion, as in
many other contexts involving executive power, the Faithful Execution Clause
is likely to remain in the background. It should supplement and not supplant
the statutory and separation-of-powers questions with which it overlaps.
Nevertheless, it is critical for the executive branch to have an adequate
account of the limits of executive enforcement discretion reflecting both
statutory and constitutional constraints. As I have argued, OLC’s account
falls short. That account elevates questions of ordinary law to the level of
constitutional law, and in doing so tolerates significant tension between the
proposed enforcement program and the statutory scheme. In practice, OLC’s
framework for enforcement discretion also proceeds from a dubious
presumption that categorical exercises of enforcement discretion that are not
clearly foreclosed by a statute are permissible, rather than from a presumption
that categorical exercises of enforcement discretion are not permissible unless
they align with a discernable (and not overgeneralized) statutory purpose.
OLC’s application of its framework, moreover, reflects significant difficulties,
including the failure to separate elements of DAPA that truly relate to
enforcement discretion from those that do not; an undue reliance on
congressional inaction as providing implied approval for DAPA; and a search
for congressional policies at such a high level of generality that statutory
constraints are overlooked.

